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THE ENGLISH VERSUS THE AMERICAN RULE
ON ATTORNEY FEES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF PUBLIC COMPANY CONTRACTS
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Millert
The American rule for attorney fees requires each party to pay its attor-
ney, win or lose; the English rule (applicable in most of the world) requires
the losing party to pay the winner's reasonable attorney fees. We study fee
clauses in 2,347 contracts in large corporations' public securities filings.
Because contracting parties can opt out of the default American rule at low
cost, we expected opting out to predominate if the English rule more efficiently
compensates counsel. Parties in fact contract out of the American rule in
60% of contracts, which far exceeds the rate of contracting out of other de-
fault dispute-resolution rules-those allowing for access to courts (avoidable
through ex ante agreement to arbitrate) and the right to a jury trial. Thus,
parties often find that the American rule is not optimal. Still, parties choose
the American rule about as often as the English rule; the remaining fee
clauses they choose are intermediate forms such as "one-way " fee shifts that
require only one of the parties to pay the other's fees.
Certain factors help explain the observed pattern of rules through their
association with acceptance of the American rule. These factors include spe-
cific contract types, the presence of a non-US. party, the absence of arbitra-
tion clauses and jury-trial waivers, selection of New York law, and a likely
long-term relation between the parties. Conversely, factors such as state laws
that impose symmetric fee responsibility and an increasing degree of contract
standardization are negatively associated with acceptance of the American
rule. More generally, our findings suggest that the American rule is not
optimal in many large commercial contracts and that sophisticated parties
often reject default rules sufficiently important to them. Theoretical models
should resist the assumption that one fee rule is most efficient in all contexts,
and models should account for real-world factors associated with fee clauses.
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INTRODUCTION
Jurisdictional competition for legal business is intense. States in
the United States have long competed for legal business,' and the
phenomenon is growing in Europe.2 Attorney-fee compensation is
one basis for competing for legal business. For example, the German
Federal Minister of Justice competes for legal business on behalf of
Germany by invoking the predictability of Germany's fees: "[T] he fees
of the lawyers for both plaintiff and defendant are the same and can
therefore be calculated from the outset."
Growing competition for legal business adds renewed importance
to assessing the use and efficiency of attorney-fees rules. The Ameri-
can rule on attorney fees ordinarily requires parties litigating disputes
I See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30
CIARDozo L. REV. 1475, 1485-87, 1503-12 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, The
Flight to New York]; Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30
CARDozo L. REv. 2073, 2079-98 (2009).
2 See THE LAW Soc'v OF ENG. & WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: THE JURISDICTION OF
CHOICE 8-16, 20 (2007), available at www.haitz-rechtsanwaelte.de/de/newsarchiv/data/
aktuelles__4_2.pdf; LAW-MADE IN GERMANY 5-29, available at http://www.lawmadein
germany.de/Law-MadeinGermany.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). The competition can
be bizarre. A brochure seeking to attract litigation business to England and Wales brags
about "the absence of any general duty of good faith." THE LAw Soc'v OF ENG. & WALES,
supra, at 5.
3 LAw-MADE IN GERMANY, supra note 2, at 29.
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to compensate their own attorneys regardless of the outcome.' In the
state of Alaska, and in most Western legal systems other than the
United States, the prevailing norm is the English rule, which provides
that the losing party must pay the winner's reasonable fees.5 Varia-
tions on the American and English rules exist, including a California
statute requiring a party to pay its adversary's fees if the party loses in
litigation under a contract that specifies that the party is to receive
fees from its adversary if it prevails.6 Rules on attorney compensation
have stimulated an animated policy debate-a dialogue characterized
in the political arena more by the intensity of the views expressed than
4 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245-47 (1975). An
exception exists for litigation found to have been vexatious or brought in bad faith. See
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991). In some settings deemed to implicate
a strong public interest, such as constitutional tort litigation, "fee-shifting" statutes modify
this rule to require losing defendants to pay prevailing plaintiffs' fees. See Robert V. Perci-
val & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 233, 240-41 (1984); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee
Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 662; Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes:
Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 321, 327-28
(1984). The motivation behind many such statutes is to enable financially disadvantaged
parties with meritorious cases to obtain counsel in situations where contingent fees are not
effective. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi, just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 717, 733 (2010)
(noting that certain fee-shifting statutes are intended to "facilitat[e] the access of low-in-
come people to the civil justice system"). Efforts to attract counsel via statutory fee shifting
have met with mixed success, however. See, e.g., Stewart]. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg,
Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Govern-
ment as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REiv. 719, 760 (1988) (finding no clear evidence that fee
shifting leads to an increase in the number of cases filed).
5 See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 lAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 44-47 (1984); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign
Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 125, 128 (2003). The
English rule has many variations and often does not provide for complete indemnification
of the winner's costs. See Pfennigstorf, supra, at 44-47. For Alaska's rule on fees, see
ALAsKA R. Cv. P. 82 (requiring the loser to pay a percentage of the winner's fees). A loser-
pays provision is also found in section 5-111(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code, pertain-
ing to violations of obligations by issuers of letters of credit. U.C.C. § 5-111(e) (2011).
Nevada allows an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party when the prevailing party has
not recovered more than $20,000. NEv. REV. STAT. § 18.010(2) (a) (2008).
6 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1717(a) (West 2009) ("In any action on a contract, where the
contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce
that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then
the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is
the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in
addition to other costs."). Washington and Oregon also have statutes similar to Califor-
nia's. See OR. REv. STAT. § 20.096 (2011) (stating that if a contract provides for fees to one
party, the prevailing party is entitled to fees); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.84.330 (West 2006
& Supp. 2012) (same). In the data set we study, attorney-fee-clause information is con-
tained in 168 contracts governed by California law, 17 governed by Washington law, and 7
governed by Oregon law. New York has a statute that has a similar effect but is limited to
landlord-tenant relations. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2006) (requiring a
landlord to pay a tenant's attorney fees if a lease of residential property requires the tenant
to pay the landlord's attorney fees).
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by convincing arguments for any particular arrangement.7 Many re-
searchers have also addressed attorney compensation from a theoreti-
cal perspective.8 But despite decades of investigation, no consensus
has emerged.9 The question remains: which rule specifies the effi-
cient arrangement for compensating counsel?
The failure of prior research to generate consensus on this issue
suggests the value of a different approach. Instead of employing a
normative or theoretical perspective, we investigate the question em-
pirically. Subject to minor constraints, contracting parties may adopt
any arrangement they wish for allocating attorney fees if a dispute
arises under the contract.' 0 They can do nothing, in which case the
background legal rule will apply." Or they can contract around the
background norm by specifying some other arrangement-a "loser-
pays" approach found in many of the world's legal systems, a one-way
fee-shifting rule awarding fees to one party if it prevails but not to the
other, or indeed any other arrangement the parties wish.' 2
The pattern of contract clauses is interesting in its own right, and
it also illuminates the policy debate about optimal-fee arrangements.
Because parties negotiate contract terms ex ante-before disputes
arise-their incentives are to adopt terms that maximize joint value.' 3
Unless externalities are present, maximizing value to the parties will
also maximize social welfare. Thus, if parties are well informed and
7 See Amir Efrati, U.S. Policy on Attorneys Fees Sparks Debate at State Level, WAL ST. J.,
May 17, 2007, at Al 2; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Ruling Limits Awarding of
Legal Fees for Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at A20.
8 See generally Rowe, supra note 4 (evaluating rationales that academics advance to
support fee-shifting rules); William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Ap-
proach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992) (exploring the English
"payment into court" rule and considering how it could be incorporated into U.S. prac-
tice); Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling
Incentives to Settle with Access to justice, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1863 (1998) (examining attorney-
compensation schemes).
9 See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 63, 64-65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (finding that the current state of economic knowledge pre-
vents reliable prediction of the effect on litigation costs or social benefit of a fee rule
requiring fuller indemnity).
10 See, e.g., 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 64 (2005) ("[G]enerally parties are free to provide
for attorney's fees by an express contractual provision.").
11 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245-47
(1975).
12 See, e.g., Percival & Miller, supra note 4, at 240; Rowe, supra note 4, at 662; Note,
supra note 4, at 328.
1s See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 209, 213, 220-30 (2000) (arguing that if the option to
litigate reduces the joint wealth of contracting parties, market forces will push them in the
direction of alternative forms of dispute resolution); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-9 (1995) ("[P]arties would tend to
adopt ADR if it would lead to mutual advantages.").
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other barriers to contracting are absent, we can expect that the deci-
sions made tend to reflect the efficient ex ante solution to contracting
problems.14 Examining contracting behavior can therefore help ad-
dress questions about dispute resolution that have heretofore been
answered only normatively or theoretically.
We employ this approach by examining 2,347 contracts filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by public firms in
2002.15 This data set offers benefits as a resource for investigating the
efficiency of dispute-resolution arrangements. The contracts in ques-
tion are drafted by the parties at the time they negotiate their deal;
both parties at this point in time share an interest in maximizing the
joint value of the contract-and therefore in adopting contract terms
that are most efficient ex ante. Because these contracts involve at least
one SEC reporting company, the terms are likely negotiated by sophis-
ticated parties and drafted by well-qualified attorneys. And because
the contracts in question are reported to the SEC in connection with
an event deemed material to the financial condition of the reporting
company, the contracts themselves are likely important to the parties.
In this data set, we can therefore expect to see parties who have real
money at stake striving to adopt the most efficient contractual terms.
We employ two approaches to assess fee-clause practices disclosed
in this data set. The first compares the rate at which contracting par-
ties opt out of the default fee rule with the rate at which the parties
opt out of two other default rules on dispute resolution: (1) the norm
that formal dispute resolution will occur in court, and (2) the right to
ajury trial.16 Contract clauses opting out of these rules take the form
of: (1) ex ante agreements to arbitrate, and (2) ex ante waivers ofjury
trial. We find that, compared with the two other default rules, parties
overwhelmingly opt out of the American rule. Parties opt out of court
litigation by using arbitration clauses in about 11% of contracts. They
opt out of jury trial in about 20% of contracts. In comparison, parties
opt out of the American rule in about 60% of contracts. The massive
opting out of the American rule suggests that this approach to attor-
14 See Hylton, supra note 13, at 220-30; Shavell, supra note 13, at 5.
15 This study continues our investigation of dispute-resolution provisions in commer-
cial contracts. Our other studies using these data are: Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an Empirical Study ofjury Trial Waiver Clauses in
Large Corporate Contracts, 4J. EMPiRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg &
Miller, Do Juries Add Value?]; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of
Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975
(2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum]; Theodore Eisen-
berg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in the Contracts ofPublicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. Rav. 335 (2007) [hereinafter
Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration]; Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight to New York,
supra note 1.
16 See infra Part IIIA.
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ney fees may not, in general, be the optimal arrangement for large
commercial contracts.
The American rule's comparative disfavor has implications for
the general methodology of this study. In prior studies of commercial
contracts, we found surprisingly low rates of opting out of litigation
(into arbitration) or trial byjury.17 While these studies suggested that
litigation and jury trials might not be as inefficient as some critics have
argued, the observed pattern could also have been due to simple iner-
tia. The same cannot be said for attorney-fees clauses, where the con-
tracting parties displayed a notable willingness to reject the
background legal rule. We infer that sophisticated parties do in fact
manage dispute-resolution clauses in large commercial contracts. In
this light, it appears likely that the failure to opt out of litigation or
jury trials represents a meaningful decision in many cases about which
arrangement best serves the needs of contracting parties.
While our first approach compares opt-out rates across three dif-
ferent default rules, our second approach focuses primarily on opting
out of the American rule.18 It describes the pattern of attorney-fee-
clause use and the pattern's relation to factors that vary-such as type
of contract, international status, and presence of other clauses. We
find that, while parties reject the default attorney-fee rule in great
numbers, they do not reach consensus about a single optimal-fee rule.
In about two-fifths of the contracts, parties opted for the English rule,
a pattern indicating that a substantial percentage of the contracting
parties believed this to be an efficient approach. However, if the En-
glish rule were preferable to the American rule in all circumstances,
we would expect to see a nearly uniform pattern of selecting that re-
gime. This was not the case. In about two-fifths of the contracts, par-
ties either specified the American rule or did nothing-in either case
leaving intact the background rule that each party pays its own attor-
ney, win or lose. The pattern shows substantial popularity for the
American rule but no consensus. In the remaining contracts-about
one-fifth of the total-parties opted out of the American rule but did
not select the English rule, electing instead a modified form of loser-
pays arrangement.
For particular types of contracts, parties show little or no variation
in the fee clause specified, suggesting either that one perceived effi-
cient clause exists for that type of contract or that industry and legal
17 See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer
Soldies: An Empirical Study ofArbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U.
MicH.J.L. REFORm 871, 876 (2008); Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 15,
at 541.
18 See infra Part IILC.
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practice may dominate fee-clause choice. 9 In other contract types,
parties displayed considerably greater fee-arrangement variation. Sig-
nificant variation also exists across states and corresponds with the
California provision limiting the effectiveness of contractual one-way
fee shifting.20 On the other hand, the observed pattern resists simple
theoretical explanation. Parties obviously take fee arrangements seri-
ously, given the substantial rate of opting out of background norms.
But it is difficult to identify a single goal they seek to achieve. Industry
norms, legal practices, and network effects obviously play an impor-
tant role in shaping contractual fee provisions.2' Beyond this, the ob-
served variation may reflect a variety of factors, including the unique
circumstances of individual contractual relationships, explanatory
variables not captured in our data set, or disagreement among attor-
neys and contracting parties about the structure of optimal-fee ar-
rangements. Future research might probe more deeply into
particular types of contracts to determine which explanations, if any,
best explain the observed pattern.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I discusses the literature
on attorney fees, identifies background factors against which we ob-
serve fee clauses, and specifies the hypotheses we test. Part II de-
scribes the data, and Part III presents the results, which are discussed
in Part IV.
I
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
This Part reviews the literature relating to the policy of attorney-
fee clauses, the theories developed with respect to such clauses, and
the relevant available empirical evidence. It then discusses back-
ground conditions against which such clauses are drafted that should
influence observed clause patterns. We then formulate hypotheses to
be explored.
A. Literature
1. Policy
Rules for compensating attorneys in civil litigation have long
been debated. 22 Those who believe that the civil justice system is out
19 See infra Appendix Tables Al-A3.
20 See infra Table 4, Appendix Table Al.
21 See, e.g., infra Appendix Table A4.
22 See, e.g., Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen & John Panzar, An Economic Analysis of
Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 Lw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 173 (1984);JohnJ. Donohue
III, Commentary, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (1991) (rebutting the argument that
adopting the English rule on fee shifting would increase the likelihood of settlements and
2013] 333
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of control sometimes propose reforms to the American rule as a solu-
tion to the problem, on the theory that if some version of the English
rule were in effect, attorneys would be deterred from filing frivolous
lawsuits in hopes of nuisance-value settlements. 2" Among such pro-
posals were the 1991 proposal of the Council on Competitiveness,24
the Republican House majority's 1994 Contract with America, 2 5 and
the proposal by former presidential candidate Texas Governor Rick
Perry.26 Various proposals have also been introduced in Congress and
state legislatures to implement some form of a loser-pays rule.27
These proposals to move toward the English rule have been resisted-
with considerable success-by those who argue that a loser-pays provi-
sion would "deter middle-income persons from pursuing reasonable
claims or defenses, and place them at an unfair disadvantage in dis-
putes with risk-neutral parties.""
2. Theory
Legal economists have created a virtual cottage industry of analyz-
ing the various incentive and efficiency effects of different fee re-
arguing that the Coase theorem suggests that the English rule would not influence settle-
ment rates).
23 See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN By REP. NEwr GINGRICH, REP. DICK
ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANCE THE NATION 143, 145-46 (Ed Gillespie &
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (claiming that the House Republicans' reform bill "penalizes
frivolous lawsuits by making the loser pick up the winner's legal fees"); ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw 239 (2001); Albert W. Alschuler, Media-
tion with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System
in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1808, 1831 (1986).
24 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 16, 19, 24, 25 (1991), reprinted in 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 993-94, 1002-03 (1992)
(proposing to revise the federal offer-of-judgment rule to include the "additional costs of
trial," presumably including attorney fees, and recommending a loser-pays rule for discov-
ery motions and for federal court diversity cases but calling for a moratorium on one-way
plaintiff-favoring fee-shifting statutes).
25 CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supro note 23.
26 See Op-Ed., Loser Pays, Everyone Wins, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010, at A20.
27 See, e.g., Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess.
1995) (proposing that a nonprevailing party must pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees
in federal civil diversity litigation where an offer of settlement has been made). In 1980,
Florida enacted a statute for medical malpractice litigation similar to the one later pro-
posed in the Attorney Accountability Act. See FLA. STAT. § 786.56 (repealed 1985). Al-
though the state medical association enthusiastically supported the statute, it was repealed
five years later, at the behest of the same group after a series of costly plaintiff victories. See
Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence
Confronts Theory, 6J.L. EcON. & ORG. 345, 355-56 (1990).
28 H.R. REP. No. 104-62, at 28 (1995). For a description of a similar policy debate in
England, see Richard Lewis, Litigation Costs and Before-the-Event Insurance: The Key to Access to
justice?, 74 MOD. L. REv. 272, 273, 277-85 (2011) (advocating for before-the-event insur-
ance as a means of providing access to justice for claimants who otherwise would not be
able to afford to participate in the legal system).
334 [ Vol. 98:327
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gimes. 29 But the volume of ink these analysts have spilled has not
resulted in agreement as to the relative social utility of the rules.30
Most analyses compare the English rule with the American rule
on attorney compensation.31 The English rule holds the potential, as
its proponents argue, to deter frivolous or nonmeritorious lawsuits
since a defendant facing such a lawsuit has an incentive to vigorously
litigate the case, knowing that it will almost certainly win and its adver-
sary will pay its fees. 32 The English rule would thus appear to serve
the socially valuable function of deterring wasteful litigation, at least
as long as the adversary is not judgment-proof and the litigant can
ascertain the probability of success before trial.33
But a more complete economic analysis must also take account of
other effects. Most importantly, relative to the American rule, the En-
glish rule increases risk to litigants by eliminating the built-in hedge
29 As Avery Katz observed in 1999: "The scholarly literature on fee shifting has flour-
ished in recent years, to the point where it is no longer feasible to discuss every pertinent
contribution." Katz, supra note 9, at 65. Eight years earlier, John J. Donohue III described
the literature on fee shifting as "immense." Donohue, supra note 22, at 1093 & n.1.
30 The following review of the literature draws in part from Katz's excellent summary.
See generally Katz, supra note 9 (providing a survey on fee shifting).
31 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1073 (1989) (analyzing the economic
roles of the American and English rules in dispute resolution); Avery Katz, Measuring the
Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 145-54
(1987) (evaluating litigation expenditures under the English rule); Herbert M. Kritzer,
Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80
TEX. L. REv. 1943, 1946-61 (2002) (reviewing the empirical literature on the impact of the
English rule on attorney behavior); Jonathan T. Molot, How US. Procedure Skews Tort Law
Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 78-81 (1997) (summarizing the influence of American civil pro-
cedure in substantive tort law); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee
Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 139-42 (1984) (surveying the impact of the En-
glish rule on settlement decisions). Among academic writers, Robert A. Kagan and Albert
W. Alschuler have been among the more vigorous proponents of moving toward the En-
glish rule as a strategy for combating perceived excesses and abuses in the American legal
system. See generally KAGAN, supra note 23 (examining the issues associated with adversarial
legalism in the United States and proposing changes to address these issues); Alschuler,
supra note 23 (criticizing the United States' adjudicative services).
32 See KAGAN, sup-a note 23, at 239; Alschuler, supra note 23, at 1831. Compare A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-
Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 141 (1998) (finding that the English rule en-
courages low-probability plaintiffs to go to trial more than the American rule does), with
David Rosenberg & Stephen M. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1985) ("(U] nder the British system the willingness of
the plaintiff to litigate and to file a claim will be less than under the usual American system
if the likelihood of prevailing is low." (emphasis omitted)).
33 See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4, 17-19 (1990). A study of Alaska's loser-pays rule found that it did not
significantly deter frivolous litigation. See SUSANNE Di PIETRO, TERESA W. CARNS & PAMELA
KELLEY, ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASIA's ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY'S FEE SHIFTING IN
CIVIL CASES 79-90, 138-42 (1995), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfee.
pdf.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
that the loser does not have to pay the winner's fees.34 This risk would
appear to be wealth reducing from a social standpoint because most
litigants can be assumed to be risk averse, and the risk is a cost both
parties must bear.35
The choice between the English and American rules may also af-
fect litigation expenditures. Some have argued that the English rule
would reduce parties' incentives to drive up their adversaries' costs,
since they face a positive probability of paying those costs in the event
they lose the case.36 On the other hand, the relatively greater risk of
the English rule implies that parties have more at stake in the litiga-
tion: they litigate not just to obtain (or avoid) a judgment but also to
obtain payment of their attorney fees and to avoid paying their adver-
sary's fees.37 The English rule also decreases the expected marginal
costs of expenditures on a party's attorney due to the possibility that
the adversary will have to pay."" Greater stakes and decreased margi-
nal costs imply that the parties may spend relatively more on litiga-
tion, a potential social cost. 9 On the other hand, the impact of
increased expenditures by one party on the other party's expenditures
is ambiguous: the adversary may ratchet up its own legal expenditures
in a form of "arms race" or may be intimidated into reducing its ef-
forts.40 Moreover, the social effect of increased litigation expendi-
tures is itself ambiguous: while transactions costs increase, the quality
and accuracy of litigation outcomes and judicial precedents may also
increase.4'
The greater risk associated with the English rule might induce
more settlements-reducing the social costs of trials-because, in a
settlement, the parties can avoid having to pay their adversaries'
fees.42 However, an alternative view is that the English rule may de-
crease the settlement rate because a condition for litigation is that the
34 See Donohue, supra note 22, at 1107-08.
35 See Alschuler, supra note 23, at 1815 n.23; Donohue, supra note 22, at 1107-08;
Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1069,
1091 (1993).
36 See Alschuler, supra note 23, at 1830-31.
3 See John J. Donohue III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical
Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 202-03
(1991) (citing John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or IlBe Suing You, 18J.
LEGAL STUD. 157, 158, 176-78 (1989)).
38 See Donohue, supra note 37, at 202.
39 This is because parties under the English rule have more to lose or gain from the
outcome and because they anticipate reimbursement for the costs incurred. See Braeu-
tigam, Owen & Panzar, supra note 22, at 180; Katz, supra note 31, at 158.
40 See Katz, supra note 9, at 67-68.
41 See id. at 67-68, 76-77.
42 See Donohue, supra note 37, at 202-03, 208 (arguing that the larger stakes associ-
ated with the English rule induce parties to settle).
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parties must be mutually optimistic,4 3 and optimistic parties may view
the opportunity to get their fees paid as an inducement to trial.44
Even if the effect on settlement rates were unambiguous, this would
not necessarily generate clear prescriptions as to social policy because
settlements have costs as well as benefits. These costs include both the
private expenditures of negotiating and enforcing the settlement45
and certain social costs: settlements deprive the legal system of valua-
ble judicial precedents and may reflect inaccurate estimates of the un-
derlying legal liabilities because of factors such as asymmetric
information or differences in risk aversion or stakes.46
The increased risks and potentially increased litigation expendi-
tures associated with the English rule may also induce potential liti-
gants not to sue in the first place.4 7 But optimistic parties may be
more inclined to file lawsuits under the English rule because they ex-
pect to win and therefore discount the risk of losing the case and hav-
ing to pay their adversaries' fees.48 The effect of the English rule on
the litigation rate is thus also ambiguous: relative to the American
rule, the English rule encourages litigation by optimistic plaintiffs but
discourages litigation by pessimistic plaintiffs.49 Moreover, like settle-
ment, a decision not to file a lawsuit is not necessarily socially efficient.
Not suing saves the cost of litigation but also reduces the deterrent
effect that the threat of litigation has on parties who might otherwise
43 The condition of mutual optimism is a basic premise of the economic analysis of
trials. See, e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 279, 296
(1973) (emphasizing the importance of parties agreeing on the probabilities of the court's
action to the role of settlement decisions); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the
Courts, 14J.L. & ECON. 61, 66 (1971) (explaining that in criminal proceedings, "a necessary
condition for a settlement is that both the defendant and prosecutor simultaneously gain
from a settlement compared to their expected trial outcomes"); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 399, 422
(1973) ("[A] principal cause of litigation is 'mutual optimism'-both parties believe they
have a good chance of winning.").
44 See Steven M. Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alterna-
tive Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STuo. 55, 65-66 (1982)
("[C]onditional on suit having been brought, the likelihood of trial under the British sys-
tem will be greater than under the American system.").
45 See Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. Rpv. 67, 72-75
(1969) (analyzing fixed costs in the bargaining and drafting stages of settlement
agreements).
46 SeeJonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99
Geo. L.J. 65, 81-84 (2010) (explaining the role of risk preference and bargaining imbal-
ances in inaccurate settlements).
47 See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 539 (3d ed. 1986); Roger
Bowles, Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz's Measuring the
Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 178
(1987); Alfred F. Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, 47 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PRoBs. 269, 281 (1984) (arguing that fee considerations may prevent the initial filing
of suits); Hause, supra note 37, at 176.
48 See Shavell, supra note 44, at 59.
40 See id. at 59, 71-73.
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violate the law.50 Further, to the degree litigation expenditures in-
crease under the English rule, this factor encourages settlements be-
cause it implies that the litigation costs avoided through settlement
will be greater.5' In this respect, the English rule may induce more
settlements, but, again, the social value of settlements versus litigation
is itself ambiguous.
Any complete welfare analysis must also evaluate the effects of
different fee regimes on primary behavior. To the degree that the
English rule encourages meritorious litigation, this effect ought to
feed back into primary conduct by encouraging people to comply with
underlying legal norms.52 However, the possibility of judicial error
complicates the analysis,55 and other policy instruments-such as
damages multipliers, punitive damages, or fines-may be more effec-
tive at inducing desirable primary behavior.54 No consensus exists
about whether the English or the American rule better promotes de-
sirable primary conduct.55
Also relevant in a complete welfare analysis is the impact of differ-
ent fee regimes on the evolution and form of the law itself. Academ-
ics take different stances regarding this impact. For instance, Robert
Prichard argues that the English rule enhances the predictability of
legal rules relative to the American rule and suggests that predictabil-
50 See id. at 71-73 ("[L]itigation will be worthwhile to society as long as its deterrent
and compensatory value exceeds total legal costs plus public administrative expenses....
[I]t is apparent that the private benefit and cost calculation may diverge from the social,
and in any direction.").
51 See Hause, supra note 37, at 158 ("The greater stakes of a trial under the indemnity
system will tend to induce larger trial expenditures than would occur under the American
system. In turn, the settlement rate will tend to be greater under the indemnity system
because of the larger gains potentially available if a settlement is reached instead of going
to trial.").
52 See Katz, supra note 9, at 76.
53 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven M. Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive
to Obey the Law, 5J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 99-103 (1989) (arguing that legal errors influence
the decision to file suit in a civil case).
54 See Louis Kaplow, Shifting Plaintiffs'Fees Versus Increasing Damage Awards, 24 RAND J.
ECON. 625, 628 (1993) ("Shifting plaintiffs' fees and increasing damage awards may affect
the likelihood of settlement differently."); Katz, supra note 9, at 77; A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies
Among Plaintiffs, 27 RAND J. EcoN. 269, 273 (1996) ("The reason it is possible to raise the
award and the penalty so as to discourage suits without reducing deterrence is, in essence,
that potential plaintiffs whose probability of prevailing is sufficiently high are favorably
affected by these changes, while potential plaintiffs whose probability is relatively low are
adversely affected.").
55 See, e.g., Clinton F. Beckner III & Avery Katz, The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee
Shifting when Legal Standards Are Uncertain, 15 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 205, 215 (1995) (find-
ing that neither the American nor the British rule on attorney-fee allocation better encour-
ages "efficient substantive behavior").
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ity is generally a desirable feature of legal systems.5 6 Keith Hylton,
however, examines the impact of a one-way offer-of-judgment rule on
the development of substantive law and concludes that a one-way pro-
plaintiff fee-shifting rule is superior to either the English or the Amer-
ican rules as a device for achieving predictability.5 7 But the English
rule or one-way fee-shifting rules may decrease rather than increase
predictability if they discourage the generation of precedents; and
predictability is not the only criterion by which one judges the efficacy
of a litigation system.
Taken as a whole, the theoretical literature is indeterminate as to
the practical effects and social utility of attorney-fee regimes. Avery
Katz aptly summarizes the situation as follows:
[T] he current state of economic knowledge does not enable us reli-
ably to predict whether a move to fuller indemnification would raise
or lower the total costs of litigation, let alone whether it would bet-
ter align those costs with any social benefits they might generate.
The reason for this agnostic conclusion is straightforward. Le-
gal costs influence all aspects of the litigation process, from the de-
cision to file suit to the choice between settlement and trial to the
question whether to take precautions against a dispute in the first
place .... The combination of all these external effects are [sic] too
complicated to be remedied by a simple rule of "loser pays." In-
stead, indemnity of legal fees remedies some externalities while fail-
ing to address and even exacerbating others.58
3. Evidence
If theory does not provide an answer, can data fill the void? Em-
pirical research on the effects of the English and American rules is
sparse.59 Don Coursey and Linda Stanley found, in an experimental
setting, that subjects settled more frequently under the English rule
than under the American rule.6 0 Edward Snyder and James Hughes,
in studies of Florida medical malpractice litigation, found that under
the English rule parties were less likely to settle filed cases, plaintiff
verdicts were more frequent, settlements were larger, and average de-
56 SeeJ. Robert S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee,
and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL. STUD. 451, 451-55
(1988).
57 See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 Cm.-KENr L. REv. 427,
452-59 (1995).
58 Katz, supra note 9, at 64-65.
59 For an excellent survey, see generally Kritzer, supra note 31 (reviewing the existing
empirical research on the effects of attorney-fee structures).
60 See Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow
of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 Iwr'L REv. L. & ECON. 161, 170 (1988).
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fense costs were higher.6' These findings suggest that the English rule
does have a significant impact on litigation strategy. But studies of
Alaska's loser-pays statute raise doubts about this conclusion.62 The
Alaska Judicial Council found little evidence that the state's English
rule affected case filing rates or had much influence on attorney
strategy.63
Simulation studies have reached inconsistent results about which
rule generates the most settlements." Katz's simulation study con-
cluded that the English rule would increase litigation expenditures,
on average, relative to the American rule. 65 Hylton, also using a simu-
lation approach, concluded that the English rule would generate
more litigation but that the two rules would generate similar levels of
legal compliance at the level of primary conduct.66
Several empirical studies have examined one-way pro-plaintiff fee-
shifting rules. Hylton found that such rules would minimize litigation
and maximize underlying legal compliance as compared to either the
American or the English rules.67 Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart
Schwab found that a one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rule increased
trials and possibly increased plaintiffs' success rates at trial but also
found little evidence that a one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting rule in-
creased the number of lawsuits filed.68
Other empirical studies have analyzed offer-of-judgment regimes,
in which if a party offers to settle a case, the counterparty is required
to pay the adversary's costs (which potentially include attorney fees) if
the outcome at trial is less favorable than the offer. Albert Yoon and
Tom Baker found that a bilateral offer-ofjudgment rule with uncap-
61 SeeJames W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 225, 238, 243 (1995); Snyder &
Hughes, supra note 27, at 374-77.
62 See Di PIETRO, CARNS & KELLEY, supra note 33, at 79-90, 138-39 (1995); Susanne Di
Pietro, The English Rule at Work in Alaska, 80 JUICATURE 88, 89-91 (1996). Another study
found "that civil and tort filings in the District of Alaska, while below the national average,
resembled those in a sample of similar districts." Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Refonn:
An Empirical Study of the Impact of Alaska's English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA
L. REv. 1, 43 (2012).
6- See Di PIETRO, CARNS & KELLEY, supra note 33, at 79-80, 106-18, 138-39.
64 Compare Hause, supra note 37, at 158 (concluding that the English rule is more
likely to encourage settlements than the American rule), and Philip L. Hersch, Indemnity,
Settlement, and Litigation: Comment and Extension, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 241 (1990) (same),
with Donohue, supra note 37, at 202-03, 203 n.32 (suggesting that the English rule would
lead to more trials).
65 See Katz, supra note 31, at 171.
66 See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence
Standard, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 459, 466, 476 (1993).
67 See id. at 459; Hylton, supra note 35, at 1071-72.
68 See Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 745-49.
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ped attorney fees reduced the time required to resolve disputes.69
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. and his colleagues conducted surveys on a two-
way offer-of-judgment rule with fees included in the sanction, finding
that the rule affected certain aspects of the hypothetical pretrial bar-
gaining.70 Coursey and Stanley's experimental study found that test
subjects settled cases under the federal offer-of-judgment rule more
frequently than under the American rule or the English rule and that
settlements tended to be more favorable to defendants than under
the American rule.71 Laura Inglis and her coauthors, using an experi-
mental approach, concluded that a symmetrical offer-of-judgment
rule covering only the costs of litigation had no effect on settlement
rates as compared to an environment lacking any cost-shifting rule,
but they also found that expanding an offer-of-judgment rule to in-
clude attorney fees as well as costs would increase settlement rates.7 2
Overall, academic research has generated few clear-cut results
other than the (obvious) conclusion that the English rule is relatively
more risky than the American rule and the (somewhat less obvious)
proposition that the English rule will tend to stimulate greater ex-
penditures if a dispute winds up in court.
B. Background Conditions
Fee-clause arrangements exist against background conditions.
Many of the contract types we study involve transactions that are simi-
lar to earlier transactions. In transactions with analogous prior trans-
actions, lawyers often begin drafting with a previously used document.
If a contract from a similar transaction contains an attorney-fee clause,
that clause will persist unless someone decides to try and change it.
The clause may exist in a prior transaction because the law office
or client has a general practice of including it in every transaction
without specifically considering its use in each case. Or the clause
may exist because the particular fee clause is common in transactions
of the relevant kind within an industry. The clause may also exist be-
cause the attorney and client concluded, after due consideration, that
69 See Albert Yoon & Torn Baker, Offer-ofJudgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empiri-
cal Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VANo. L. REv. 155, 159, 191-93
(2006).
70 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & David A. Anderson, One-Way Fee Shifting Statutes and Offer
ofJudgment Rules: An Experiment, 36JURIMETRICsJ. 255, 273 (1996); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. &
Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 13, 30 (1988); Rowe, supra note 31, at 163-71.
71 See Coursey & Stanley, supra note 60, at 170-75.
72 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel R. Simmons & Erik Tallrot, Ex-
periments on the Effects of Fee Shifting and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims 20-30
(The Berkeley Elec. Press Legal Series, Working Paper No. 501, 2005), available at http://
law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/501.
73 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 9, at 72; Kritzer, supra note 31, at 1957.
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the clause was best for the client and the counterparty did not ob-
ject. For example, a loser-pays rule has little appeal to a party who
believes that its counterparty cannot afford to pay fees if the party
prevails. Regardless of the cause, a fee clause may persist even when it
is not value maximizing if, in the individual case, the costs of changing
the clause exceed the benefits.
Law governing fee clauses should also influence whether a new
transaction retains a clause. This effect can be independent of the
reasons leading to a clause's past use in a given type of transaction.
Common use of a clause in a transaction governed by one state's law
does not necessarily support its use if another state's law governs. The
most important feature of state law governing fee clauses is whether it
imposes two-way fee shifting when a contract provides for one-way
shifting. And, for at least one class of contracts, public bond inden-
tures, federal law influences fee-clause provisions.7 5
As noted above, California, Oregon, and Washington law provide
that a contract with one-way fee shifting is deemed to implement two-
way fee shifting. 7 6 If a contract provides that one party receive fees if
it prevails, California Civil Code section 1717 automatically changes
the contract to a loser-pays contract.7 7 Section 1717 effectively trans-
forms one-way fee shifting to the English rule.7 8 Given section 1717
and similar statutes, parties have little incentive to include a one-way
fee-shifting provision in states following the California rule.
Another background legal norm is found in the federal Trust In-
denture Act of 1939 (TIA), which provides default provisions relating
to attorney fees that are deemed to be included in indentures unless
expressly excluded.79 Section 315(e) of the TIA states:
The indenture to be qualified shall automatically be deemed
(unless it is expressly provided therein that any such provision is
excluded) to contain provisions to the effect that all parties thereto,
including the indenture security holders, agree that the court may
in its discretion require, in any suit for the enforcement of any right
or remedy under such indenture, or in any suit against the trustee
for any action taken or omitted by it as trustee, the filing by any
party litigant in such suit of an undertaking to pay the costs of such
suit, and that such court may in its discretion assess reasonable
74 One practitioner, after hearing a presentation based on this Article, stated: "It is my
practice to consider whether or not to add an attorney's fees clause to an agreement: which
side is more likely to sue; can the other side pay our side's legal fees; is our client a 'deep
pocket.'"
75 See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939 §§ 315(e), 323(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ooo(e),
77www(a) (2006).
76 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
77 See id.
78 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 2009); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
79 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 318(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77rrr(c).
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costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, against any party litigant
in such suit, having due regard to the merits and good faith of the
claims or defenses made by such party litigant . ... s
This clause vests discretion in a court to award attorney fees to either
party, based in part on the merits of the litigants' positions. As such, it
resembles a loser-pays rule with discretion vested in the court about
whether to award fees. The TIA also dictates that a similar rule apply
in litigation involving misleading statements relating to trust inden-
tures.81 These fee-related provisions can be expected to influence the
frequency of types of fee clauses in bond indenture agreements.
C. Hypotheses
Our study, the first of its type, formulates and tests hypotheses
about contracting parties opting out of three default rules-the Amer-
ican rule, access to court, and availability of jury trial-at different
rates, and parties selecting one fee rule over another. As discussed
above, selection of a fee rule provides evidence about the ex ante effi-
cient contractual solution.82 Because the contracts in our data set are
drafted by business attorneys for business clients, we expect them to
reflect prevailing attitudes in the business community.
Our first hypothesis-that parties will tend to opt out of the
American rule-is relevant to both approaches to the data. With re-
spect to comparing the rates at which sophisticated contracting par-
ties opt out of three default rules, the hypothesis is readily
supportable. The often-expressed preference for the English rule
contrasts with litigator skepticism, in at least some contexts, about the
fairness of arbitration.83 And our prior study indicates that the con-
80 Id. § 315(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(e). The Act limits the applicability of the fee provi-
sion in the following proviso:
Provided, That the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any suit
instituted by such trustee, to any suit instituted by any indenture security
holder, or group of indenture security holders, holding in the aggregate
more than 10 per centum in principal amount of the indenture securities
outstanding, or to any suit instituted by any indenture security holder for
the enforcement of the payment of the principal of or interest on any in-
denture security, on or after the respective due dates expressed in such
indenture security.
Id. (emphasis added).
81 See id. § 323(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a).
82 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
83 See ABA SECTION OF LrnG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT
181 (2009) (finding that both plaintiff and defense counsel report that arbitration is more
likely to produce a less fair outcome than litigation would produce); see also AlexanderJ.S.
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EmiuRi-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011) (indicating that there is a "significant repeat-em-
ployer-arbitrator pairing effect in which employees" fare worse "where the same arbitrator
is involved in more than one case with the same employer, a finding supporting some of
the fairness criticisms directed at mandatory employment arbitration").
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tracts in our sample rarely opt for arbitration.84 The matter is less
clear with respect to opting out of the American rule on fees com-
pared to waiving jury trial. Evidence exists that only about 36.5% of
trials involving contracts between two businesses were before juries.85
Thus, one should not necessarily expect parties to reject the American
rule more than they rejectjury trial since business disputes tend not to
have jury trials. Nevertheless, about 80% of the contracting parties in
our sample declined to waive jury trial ex ante,86 so it is not unreason-
able to forecast a higher opt-out rate from the American rule.
With respect to the particular choice-of-fee rule, as discussed
above, business interests have tended to support loser-pays arrange-
ments in the political arena.87 The one relevant U.S. survey of busi-
ness attorneys of which we are aware supports Alaska's retention of its
loser-pays rule.88 Thus, we hypothesize that the contracts in our data
set will display a significant level of opting out of the American rule.89
Hypothesis: Most of the contracts in the data will opt out of the American
rule.
Given that most Western countries administer some form of a
loser-pays system,90 we may hypothesize that foreign counterparties in
international contracts will feel uncomfortable with the U.S. approach
and bargain for use of their own attorney-compensation rules.91 This
84 Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 15, at 335, 350.
85 The 36.5% estimate is the authors' calculation using the data contained in U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, STUDY No. 23862, CIVILJUSTICE SURVEY OF
STATE COURTS, 2005, available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/
23862/detail. For a description and analysis of these data, see generally LYNN LANOTON &
THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE
COURTS, 2005 (2008) (presenting and summarizing the data). The calculation is based on
contracts cases in the data that contain at least one business entity as a defendant and at
least one business entity as a plaintiff. The results are weighted to reflect the sample de-
sign of the survey, which included 46 of the 75 largest counties in the United States and
106 of the smaller counties in the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUpra.
86 Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 539, 552.
87 See Op-Ed., supra note 26.
88 A survey of business attorneys in Alaska, which administers a loser-pays rule, found
overwhelming support for retaining the rule rather than reverting to the American rule.
See DI PIETRO, CARNs & KELLEY, supra note 33, at 143 ("96% of the [surveyed] attorneys who
spent half or more of their time handling business and corporate matters wanted to keep
[Alaska's version of the English rule].").
89 The hypothesis is a "soft" one in that at least one countervailing force is at work.
All of the contracts in our sample have a sufficient U.S. connection to appear in the SEC
EDGAR database. The American rule likely would be the default rule unless the parties
expend effort to overcome it.
90 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
91 Evidence exists demonstrating that attitudes toward dispute-resolution provisions
can noticeably vary between the United States and other countries. A law firm survey
shows large differences between U.S. and U.K. counsel with respect to use of arbitration.
See FULBRIGHT & JAWORSli L.L.P., FULBRIGHT'S 6TH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY RE-
PORT 21-22 (2009), available at http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/2009
AnnualLitigationTrendsSurveyFindingsReport.pdf (reporting that 51% of U.K. companies
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preference should result in observation of a lower rate of American-
rule use in international contracts compared to contracts in which
both parties are domestic.
This international-contracts comparison is of special interest be-
cause it may provide a cleaner test than other comparisons of the per-
ceived efficient rule. Some background conditions, such as the
clauses in previous transactions, should be less dominant in interna-
tional transactions. Although the U.S. party's background experience
is more likely to be with the American rule, the English rule will be
more familiar to the foreign party. Differing background experiences
should lead international-contract parties to focus specifically on the
fee rule. The parties are more likely to perceive the rule that emerges
from this process as the efficient rule than a fee rule shaped by the
shared background of domestic experience.
Hypothesis: Loser-pays provisions will be more frequently observed in inter-
national contracts.
Attorney-fees provisions can be included in contracts that specify
that dispute resolution shall be by arbitration rather than litigation.
The rules of some dispute-resolution associations provide arbitrators
with discretion to award fees, but, unless the parties so specify, the
arbitrator (if the arbitration is domestic) is unlikely to deviate from
the American rule.92 Thus, some commentators encourage attorneys
drafting arbitration agreements to consider including a specific "pro-
vision authorizing the arbitrator to award attorneys' fees."93 The En-
glish rule or other fee-shifting rules may be difficult to administer in
arbitration, however, because identifying the prevailing party may be
impossible.94 Moreover, the broad discretion given to arbitrators may
vitiate the English rule's effect because the arbitrator can engage in
nontransparent tradeoffs between the award on the merits and the
surveyed preferred arbitration for domestic disputes compared to 32% of U.S. companies,
and noting that a higher fraction of U.K companies had commenced international arbitra-
tions). Some authority exists to the effect that if the chosen law is one that would author-
ize fee shifting, the court may award fees according to that law's rules. See Katz v. Berisford
Int'l PLC, No. 96 Civ. 8695 (JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9535, at *19-27 (S.D.N.Y. July 6,
2000) (applying the English rule in a contract containing a choice-of-law clause specifying
English law, despite a conflict of laws between New York law and English law); Cutler v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 441 F. Supp. 863, 864-65 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (applying
the English rule on attorney fees to an action brought in California by a Spanish plaintiff
against Bank of America resulting from the theft of items from the plaintiffs safety deposit
box in a London branch of the bank).
92 See, e.g., Tony Starr, Choosing Between Litigation and Arbitration, Bos. BJ., Mar./Apr.
2005, at 31, 32.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Moore v. First Bank of San Luis Obispo, 996 P.2d 706, 710 (Cal. 2000)
(affirming the arbitrator's decision that each party must bear its own attorney fees, despite
a fee-shifting provision that was favorable to the bank, because the arbitrator did not desig-
nate a prevailing party).
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award of fees.95 Accordingly, we may hypothesize that the parties may
perceive little benefit in opting out of the American rule in the case of
arbitrations.
Like the international-contracts comparison, comparing fee-
clause use across contracts with and without arbitration clauses may be
especially informative in identifying the perceived efficient fee rule.
Arbitration clauses in our set of contracts are surprisingly rare; they
appear in less than 11% of the contracts.96 Parties who agree to an
infrequently used provision that carries the serious consequence of
opting out of the court system are likely to have focused on dispute-
resolution clauses.97 Background practices, such as clauses used in
prior transactions, are less likely to appear by default in such
contracts.
Hypothesis: Loser-pays clauses will be less commonly observed in contracts
that provide for mandatory arbitration.
The degree to which a contract is relational may be associated
with the type of attorney-fee clause used.98 In "one-off" arrange-
ments-for example, the sale of an asset-the parties anticipate a
brief relationship, extending (absent problems with the sale) only to
the closing of the transaction. 9 In other contracts-employment
contracts being paradigmatic-the parties anticipate a substantial pe-
riod of performance during which they will have to work together. 0
In long-term, relational arrangements, the parties may wish to avoid
the English rule, which requires that one party be deemed to be in the
right and the other be deemed in the wrong-a consequence that
may enhance the possibility of strained relations by requiring one
party to pay the other's fees. 01
95 See, e.g., JAMEs ACRET & ANNETrE DAVIs PERROCHET, CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION
HANDBOOK § 12:13 (2012 ed. 2012) ("Arbitrators are free to award on the basis
of broad principles of fairness and equity, and an arbitrator need not make findings or
state reasons in support of the award.").
96 Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 15, at 335, 351 tbl.2.
97 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 92, at 32 (advocating that parties who have decided to
include an arbitration provision "focus carefully and thoughtfully on drafting the arbitra-
tion provision, and resist the temptation to simply insert [a] boilerplate arbitration
provision").
98 Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103, 124
(1988) ("The more relational an exchange, the more unlikely it is that parties will plan and
allocate risks optimally. Their promises can be incomplete at best. As a result, relational
norms such as cooperation and compromise, rather than promises, largely govern these
parties' associations.").
99 See id. ("[D]iscrete exchange, such as buying a coat off the rack, requires relatively
little interaction between parties.").
100 See David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 461, 468 (1992) ("Many of the contracts into which
firms enter are long-term relationships with suppliers, lenders, and employees.").
101 See, e.g., Snyder & Hughes, supra note 27, at 345 (discussing how under the English
rule, the losing party bears the costs of both parties). The English rule may also double
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Hypothesis: Loser-pays rules will be less frequently observed in relational
contracts than in one-off contracts.
Our prior studies identified a significant association between the
standardization of contract terms and other dispute-resolution deci-
sions, such as the decision to submit disputes to mandatory arbitration
or to waive jury-trial rights. 0 2 It is therefore worth exploring whether
standardization is also associated with fee-clause choice. As in prior
studies, we use the distribution of the choice-of-law pattern for each
contract type as an objective measure of standardization.1 0 3 A con-
tract type with a standardized choice-of-law provision likely has greater
standardization than contract types that designate many choices of
law.' 04 Based on this measure, some financial transactions, such as
bond indentures, credit commitments, pooling and servicing agree-
ments, security agreements, trust agreements, and underwriting
agreements, have high standardization.1 05 Asset sale/purchase agree-
ments, merger contracts, and securities purchase agreements have in-
termediate standardization.10 6 Less regularized transactions, such as
employment contracts, settlements, and licensing agreements, have
relatively low standardization. 07
Contract standardization, standing alone, need not suggest that a
particular attorney-compensation rule is the most efficient, but it may
have implications for the distribution of fee clauses.' 0s We expect that
parties will have negotiated less standardized contracts with some
care. Since parties presumably gave more individual attention to each
contract, the distribution of attorney-fee clauses in such contracts
might be more diffuse than the distribution in more standardized
contracts. In addition, the fact of high standardization may reflect a
prior history of detailed negotiations concerning repeat-pattern trans-
actions. 09 If the historical negotiated terms were the product of sub-
stantial bargaining, more highly standardized classes of contracts
might be expected to have settled on what parties perceived to be an
litigation costs, which are ultimately borne by one party. See id. at 351. The imposition of
such a burden could strain the long-term contractual relationship between the parties.
102 See Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 542, 554-57; Eisen-
berg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 15, at 342-43, 353-57.
10 Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 554-57.
104 See id. at 554.
105 See id. at 554-56. For a description of pooling and servicing agreements, see infra
note 124 and accompanying text.
106 See Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 554-56.
107 See id.
108 Cf id. at 556-57 (finding a "definite trend," but not a monotonic relation, between
standardization and the rate of jury-trial-waiver provisions).
109 SeeJustin Sweet, Standard Construction Contracts: Some Advice to Construction Lawryers,
40 S.C. L. REv. 823, 827 (1989) ("Even experienced owners who do not use national
standard contracts will develop their own general conditions for use in repeated
transactions.").
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optimal-fee clause. This view would support less variability in the dis-
tribution of fee clauses.
Aside from these distributional forecasts, standardized contracts
may simply reflect a preference for a set of default rules. Since the
default rule for fees in the United States is the American rule," 0 one
might expect highly standardized contracts to prefer, perhaps by de-
fault, the American rule.
Hypotheses: (1) Loser-pays provisions will be more frequently observed in
individually negotiated contracts and less frequently observed in standardized
contracts; (2) the distribution of fee clauses will be more variable in less stan-
dardized contracts.
Loser-pays rules increase the risk of litigation."' It is possible,
therefore, that parties may shun loser-pays rules when litigation is in-
herently risky. This possibility suggests a potential interaction be-
tween loser-pays rules and jury-trial waivers. Because juries are
thought to increase litigation risk," 2 testing whether the failure to
bargain away jury trial is associated with the reduced likelihood that a
loser-pays provision will be adopted and, conversely, whether the pres-
ence of ajury-trial waiver increases the likelihood that a loser-pays rule
will be adopted is of particular interest. As noted above, ex ante jury-
trial waivers, like arbitration clauses, are rare and occur in only about
20% of our sample.' 13 Comparing fee-clause use across contracts with
and without jury-trial waiver clauses, like the comparisons for interna-
tional contracts and arbitration clauses, may be especially telling evi-
dence about the perceived efficient fee clause." 4 The presence of a
clause waiving jury trial is evidence that the parties have tended not to
rely on prior forms.' 15
Hypothesis: Loser-pays rules will be more frequently observed in the pres-
ence of jury-trial waivers.
Attorney-fee clauses may reflect industry-specific patterns." 6 A
contract term on attorney fees may develop in an industry and be per-
petuated by practice or inertia while a different term may appear in
another industry. Contracts in some industries may be more subject
o10 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245-47 (1975);
Kritzer, supra note 31, at 1946.
nI See Donohue, supra note 22, at 1107-08; Donohue, supra note 37, at 202-03; Hause,
supra note 37, at 176.
112 See Eisenberg & Miller, DoJuries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 543, 545-46.
113 See id. at 541, 553 tbl.2.
114 See id. at 583 n.84; Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 15, at
335, 349-51, 369.
115 See Eisenberg & Miller, Do juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 545-48, 556-57.
116 See, e.g., infra Appendix Table A4; cf Eisenberg & Miller, DoJuries Add Value?, supra
note 15, at 555-57, 566 (finding that jury "[w]aiver clause use varies by industry").
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to breach than contracts in other industries, leading to potential pref-
erences for one type of attorney-fee provision over another.117
Hypothesis: Loser-pays rules will be more frequent in some industries than
others.
We forego examining the relation between fee clauses and attor-
ney locale because the available information about attorney locale
suggests that no locale accounts for more than 11.4% of the con-
tracts."* We do, however, report results based on the governing law
specified in contracts. As previously reported, New York dominates as
the governing choice of law in the contracts studied here. 119 New
York-specific effects, if they exist, should be accounted for in assessing
the pattern of fee clauses specified. In addition, a key background
condition is the substantive California law regulating attorney-fee
clauses.120
Hypotheses: (1) The choice of New York law or forum will be significantly
correlated with the type of fee provision chosen; (2) the choice of California law
or forum will be significantly correlated with the fee provision chosen.
II
THE DATA
The data consist of twelve types of material contracts contained as
exhibits to Form 8-K "current report" filings with the SEC in 2002.121
SEC reporting firms must file Form 8-K to disclose certain material
corporate events or changes that the company has not previously re-
ported.122 We searched all Form 8-K filings and coded information
about any contract that fit into one of Table 1's categories. We elimi-
nated contracts that did not fit into one of the twelve contract types
described below, as well as sixty-seven contracts for which suitable fee-
clause information was not available. The resulting sample consists of
2,347 contracts.
We coded the contracts for a variety of contract terms, including
terms related to the settlement of disputes that might arise under the
117 See Hillman, supra note 98, at 131 ("Contract law is a 'club,' held in reserve, that
reinforces parties' business cultures." (footnote omitted)).
118 See Eisenberg & Miller, Do juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 565 tbl.9 (showing 269
of 2347 contracts as having New York attorney locale).
119 See Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight to New York, supra note 1, at 1478. We do not
assess the relation between choice-of-forum and attorney-fee clauses because so many of
the contracts in our sample did not specify a forum, see id. at 1503-04, and because the
pattern of choice of forum for those contracts specifying a forum is "largely explained by
choice of law," id. at 1504.
120 See CaL. Civ. CODE § 171 7 (a) (West 2009); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
121 See infra Table 1.
122 For the current rules on filing a Form 8-K, see SEC, Form 8-K, available at http://
sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (specifying certain material events that an issuer must
report by filing Form 8-K with the SEC).
2013] 349
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
contract as well as information on the nature and location of the con-
tracting parties. We also coded the type of contract, as shown in Ta-
ble 1. For eleven contract categories, we studied six months of
contracts, covering the period from January 1 to June 30, 2002. For
merger contracts, the study covered a seven-month period from Janu-
ary 1 to July 31, 2002. The slightly expanded period for merger con-
tracts draws on our earlier work on choice of law and choice of forum
in merger contracts. 123 Most of the contract types are self-explana-
tory. "Pooling and servicing" contracts are used in mortgage pass-
through and other asset-backed securities arrangements; they re-
present agreements under which an owner transfers receivables to a
trustee who holds title to and collects the income from the assets and
passes the funds through to investors.124 Trust agreements establish
these trusts and define certain powers and responsibilities.12 5
TABLE 1: TYPES OF CONTRACTS STUDIED
(number of contracts in parentheses)
Asset sale/purchase (299) Pooling & servicing (169)
Bond indentures (154) Securities purchase (442)
Credit commitments (215) Security agreements (35)
Employment (109) Settlements (71)
Licensing (46) Trust agreements (45)
Mergers (410) Underwriting (352)
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January
2002 to June 30, 2002, for all contract types other than mergers and January
2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Securities purchase agreements were the most frequent contract
type, accounting for 18.8% of the total. Credit-related contracts-
bond indentures, credit commitments, pooling and servicing agree-
ments, and security agreements-accounted for another 24%.
Merger contracts were about 17% of the sample, but note that the
data for these contracts cover one extra month. Together, the con-
tract types offer a reasonably rich variety of relations. Several contract
types, including the credit-related contracts, obviously involve substan-
tial financial institutions. Others, like asset sale or purchase and
123 See Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, supra note 15, at 1981,
1983-84.
124 See, e.g., Circuit City Credit Card Master Trust, Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex.
4.2 (Jan. 31, 2002). See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future
of Security, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2004) (describing this type of agreement as a
particular asset-backed security-a pure pass-through certificate-in which "the owner of
the receivables transfers them to a trustee pursuant to a trust agreement in exchange for
certificates that represent a 100 percent beneficial ownership interest in the receivables"
(footnote omitted)).
125 See Plank, supra note 124, at 1662-67; see, e.g., First Consumers Nat'l Bank, Current
Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 4.3 (Jan. 31, 2002).
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merger contracts, typically involve corporate restructurings. Settle-
ments involved resolution of disputes. Employment contracts offer in-
sights into dispute-resolution contract terms in agreements between
key employees and large corporate employers.
The key outcome variable in this study is the contracts' treatment
of attorney fees. For purposes of coding attorney-fee clauses, we con-
structed a taxonomy of fee provisions. We construed a contract as
containing no fee shifting (the American rule) when the contract did
not mention fees or when it expressly invoked the standard American
rule.126 We coded a contract as containing the English rule if the con-
tract specified that the losing party would pay attorney fees.' 27 The
English rule, under which the losing party pays, is illustrated by the
following clause: "In the event of any dispute hereunder, or in the
event of any action to enforce the terms and provisions of this Agree-
ment, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other
his reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements and other costs in-
curred in connection therewith."128 We coded a clause as employing
the English rule with discretion when the court has discretion to award
fees to the prevailing party but the fee is not an entitlement. 29
In addition to the symmetric fee risks of the English and Ameri-
can rules, some contracts provide that only one party is liable for fees.
For example, one of the contracts we studied involved a merger in
which a nonreporting company was the surviving corporation and the
key stockholder of the target company agreed to indemnify other par-
ties, including the nonreporting company, for losses, liabilities,
claims, and damages relating to the transaction, including attorney
fees.130 No indemnity flowed the other way.' 31 Similarly, in an em-
ployment agreement with the reporting company Vizacom Inc., the
126 See, e.g., SAN Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 10.1 § 8(1) (Jan. 3,
2002) ("Each of the Parties will bear its own costs and expenses (including legal fees and
expenses) incurred in connection with this Agreement and the transactions contemplated
hereby.").
127 See, e.g., J2 Commc'ns, Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 10.2 § 9(g) (May 31,
2002).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., BancorpSouth, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 4.8 § 5.14 (Jan. 28,
2002) ("All parties to this Indenture agree . . . that [the] court may in its discretion assess
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against any party litigant in such
suit, having due regard to the merits and good faith of the claims or defenses made by such
party litigant . . . "). This fee clause, like other fee clauses, introduces further complexity
into the taxonomy of fee clauses because the loser-pays rule does not apply to all parties
affected by the indenture, such as the trustee. See id.
130 See North Shore Capital III, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 2.1 § 10.2 (Apr.
16, 2002).
131 See id.
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employee agreed to pay the costs that Vizacom might incur in connec-
tion with its efforts to enforce a confidentiality provision.132
A final contract category involves fee clauses under which parties
may benefit from the clauses in different circumstances.1'3  Those fee
clauses, which do not fit one of the above categories, are coded as
"other." This coding would apply, for example, to some indemnifica-
tion clauses that indemnify both parties but under different
circumstances. 3 4
Table 2 summarizes the pattern of attorney-fee clauses. In the
interest of initial simplicity, it does not differentiate by contract type,
international status, or other characteristics. Table 2 shows, for exam-
ple, that about 37% of the contracts specified or retained by default
the American rule of each side paying its own fees. This is approxi-
mately the same percentage of contracts that specify the English rule.
Together, the American and English rules account for about 80% of
the contracts, with a fee clause favoring one party or the other appear-
ing in approximately 17% of the contracts.
TABLE 2: FREQUENCY OF ATTORNEY-FEE CLAusEs
Contractual-fee rule Number %
American rule 870 37.1%
English rule 855 36.4%
English rule, with discretion 101 4.3%
One company pays fees 404 17.2%
Other 117 5.0%
Total 2347 100.0%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from
January 2002 to June 30, 2002, for all contract types other than
mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
III
EMPRICAL RESULTS
We do not observe the original transactions from which the ob-
served contracts evolved. We therefore reiterate that our data cannot
establish whether particular fee clauses appear in contracts because of
background factors, such as tendencies of law offices or industries to
use particular fee clauses, or because the parties believed the clause
t32 See Vizacom Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 10.2 § 7(e) (Jan. 14, 2002).
133 See, e.g., FASTNET Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 2.1 § 10 (Apr. 19,
2002).
134 See id. As another illustration, the contract may provide that the seller must pay the
buyer's attorney fees if the court finds that the seller made a misrepresentation or false
warranty, and that the buyer must pay the seller's fees if the court holds that the buyer
wrongfully failed to deliver the purchase price at the closing.
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was most efficient for their transaction. Conditional on background
factors, our results show what sophisticated parties regarded as opti-
mal-fee clauses. Interpreting the different rates of fee clauses' use, we
report below for contracts specifying that California law governs com-
pared to contracts specifying another state's law governs is less diffi-
cult. Transactions do not fundamentally differ across states, so
interstate differences in fee-clause use are reasonably attributable to
differences in legal rules, with the usual reservations about the use of
observational data.
This Part first presents results showing the opt-out rate from the
American rule compared to the opt-out rates from court adjudication
(by requiring arbitration) and jury trial. Next, this Part shows the im-
portance of the California rule's symmetric attorney-fee requirement.
It then reports the relation between hypothesized individual factors
and fee-clause choice. Finally, this Part presents regression results
that model specification of the American rule as a function of multi-
ple factors.
A. Opt-Out Rates from Default Dispute-Resolution Clauses
Our first assessment of the American rule is the rate at which
parties reject the rule compared to the rate at which they reject other
dispute-resolution clauses. Table 3's first two rows show that parties
contract around the default court setting through an ex ante arbitra-
tion clause in only 10.6% of contracts. The third and fourth rows
show that parties contract out of jury trial in about 20% of contracts.
The last two rows show that, in comparison, parties contract out of the
American rule on fees in over 60% of contracts.
Substantial rejection of the American rule, as shown in Table 3,
demonstrates that parties do not passively accept default dispute-reso-
lution rules. Although passive acceptance might explain the arbitra-
tion and jury-trial opt-out patterns, it is inconsistent with the fee-clause
pattern. Since we assess opt-out rates from three default rules in the
same contracts, many factors affecting these rates are constant. Each
contract has the same parties, the same subject matter, the same in-
dustry, the same attorneys, and the same time of negotiation. The
high rate of default-fee-rule rejection can thus be interpreted as show-
ing the parties' (or attorneys') views of the desirability of the rule
compared to the other default rules.
B. The Effect of State Law: The California Rule
The data include transactions of similar types governed by differ-
ent choices of law. Table 4 shows the use of fee clauses for the leading
choice-of-law states-Delaware, New York, and California, which we
combined with Oregon and Washington, the two other states that
3532013]
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TABLE 3: RATE OF DEFAULT RULE ACCEPTANCE,
BY KIND OF DISPUTE-RESOLUTION CLAUSE
Accept default Opt out of
Dispute-resolution clause rule default rule Total
Arbitration (default = no arbitration) no. 2554 304 2858
% 89.4% 10.6% 100%
Jury trial (default = no waiver) no. 2256 560 2816
% 80.1% 19.9% 100%
Attorney fee (default = American rule) no. 870 1477 2347
% 37.1% 62.9% 100%
Sources: Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 553 tbl.2; Eisenberg & Miller,
The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 15, at 351 tbl.2; SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these
data span from January 2002 to June 30, 2002, for all contract types other than mergers and
January 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no.=number of contracts. The major difference between the number of contracts in the
total column is due to excluding the contract category "other" from this study.
have adopted California's rule of symmetric fee shifting' 35-and all
other states combined. Table 4 demonstrates that California-rule con-
tracts contain the English rule much more often than contracts gov-
erned by other states' laws. California-rule contracts specify the
English rule, with or without discretion, just over 51% of the time,
more than the approximately 35% of the time parties use the English
rule in other states.136 In contracts that select either the American
rule or the English rule, California-rule contracts specify the English
rule at a statistically significantly higher rate (p<0.001) than other
states.137
135 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
136 The weighted average of use of the English rule in Delaware, New York, and other
locales is 35.5%.
137 Formally, the significance level reported in the text can be viewed as exploring the
hypothesis that the full populations of contracts subject to the California rule and contracts
not subject to the California rule, of which we observe only samples, are equally likely to
specify the American rule given the rates at which the American rule is observed to be
specified in our data. By convention, the hypothesis being tested is called the null hypoth-
esis. See GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRmN, STATISTICAL METHODS 64 (8th ed.
1989) (explaining the process of statistical hypothesis testing). The reported significance
level, which is also-often referred to as a p-value, represents the probability of rejecting the
null hypothesis when it is in fact true. In this case, an incorrect rejection of the null hy-
pothesis would lead to the mistaken conclusion that, in the full populations of California-
rule and non-California-rule contracts, the American rule is selected at different rates. The
p-value measures the likelihood that the observed differences in rates are attributable to
mere random sampling variation rather than to real differences. See id. If the p-value is
0.05, for example, there is a 5% probability that the observed or larger differences could
occur by chance if in fact the null hypothesis were true. By arbitrary convention, p-values
at or below the 0.05 level are described as statistically significant. See THE EVOLVING ROLE
OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS As EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 197 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed.,
1989). The small p-value reported in text indicates that, for these data, one is extremely
unlikely to reject the null hypothesis by chance. That is, it is extremely unlikely that the
full populations of California-rule and non-California-rule contracts, of which we observe
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TABLE 4: FREQUENCY OF ATrORNEY-FEE CLAUSES, By GoVERNING LAW
Eng. rule, One co.
Governing law Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
DE no. 123 93 2 81 21 320
% 38.4% 29.1% 0.6% 25.3% 6.6% 100.0%
NY no. 385 417 88 181 38 1109
% 34.7% 37.6% 7.9% 16.3% 3.4% 100.0%
CA rule no. 57 98 5 23 9 192
% 29.7% 51.0% 2.6% 12.0% 4.7% 100.0%
Other no. 257 217 6 113 43 636
% 40.4% 34.1% 0.9% 17.8% 6.8% 100.0%
Total no. 822 825 101 398 111 2257
% 36.4% 36.6% 4.5% 17.6% 4.9% 100.0%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 toJune 30, 2002,
for all contract types other than mergers andJanuary 2002 toJuly 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. =
discretion. CA-rule states are California, Oregon, and Washington. The total number of con-
tracts reported in the table is less than 2,347 because no choice of law was coded for some
contracts.
This greater rate is not due to one or two contract types. Appen-
dix Table Al shows that, for every contract type for which our data
contain more than two California-rule contracts, these contracts speci-
fied the English rule at a rate equal to or higher than other states'
rates.138 Table 4 provides evidence that one important factor influ-
encing the choice-of-fee clauses is whether state law imposes two-way
shifting whenever one-way fee shifting is specified. In presenting
other results below, we will note whether they are sensitive to this Cali-
fornia-rule effect.
C. Bivariate Results
Table 2 above shows that no fee clause dominates across all con-
tract types. While Table 2 supports the hypothesis that sophisticated
parties flee the American rule (because 62.9% of contracts specify ei-
ther the English rule or a variant of one-party shifting), no uniform
opt out from the American rule into the English rule appears. The
American rule is as prominent as any other fee-clause provision. In-
deed, if one accounts for California section 1717's effective imposition
of the English rule if the contract specifies one-way fee shifting,139 Ta-
ble 4 shows that parties use the American rule more frequently than
they do the English rule.
only a sample, in fact have the same rates of using the American rule, given the rates in the
sample we observe.
138 See infra Appendix Table Al.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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An additional question is whether contract or party characteris-
tics help explain the observed fee-clause pattern. Table 5 reports the
frequency of fee clauses by contract type. The table shows some
strong associations between contract type and type of fee clause. The
English rule with discretion as to the fee dominates bond indenture
contracts, accounting for 62.3% of the contracts. This relation is un-
surprising in light of the TIA provisions discussed in Part 1.140 The
English rule dominates underwriting agreements, covering 92.3% of
the contracts, but this characterization of the underwriting contracts'
fee clauses is debatable, as described in Part IV below.141 The fee
structure where one company pays fees dominates in trust agree-
ments, which in our sample are parts of loan transactions with the
borrower agreeing to pay attorney fees.
As shown in Table 5, however, for most contract types, neither
the American nor the English rule dominates. Parties to loan agree-
ments (credit commitments and security agreements) opt mostly to
require the nonreporting company-usually the borrower-to pay
the lender's fees. When those agreements do not contain such a
clause, parties tend to employ the American rule. For six of the seven
other contract types, the American and English rules appear at
roughly similar rates, with the spread between them not exceeding
15%. Pooling and servicing contracts employ our residual category of
"other" fee clauses at the highest rate. Appendix Table Al shows
greater dominance of the American rule for all contract types other
than underwriting contracts if one excludes California.142
We hypothesized that parties to international contracts would opt
for loser-pays rules. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results for con-
tracts between domestic parties, and Panel B reports the results for
contracts with a non-U.S. party. The surprising result is that non-U.S.
parties do not opt out of the American rule more frequently than do-
mestic parties. If one limits the sample to contracts that specify either
the American or English rule, domestic contracts contained the Amer-
ican rule in 764 of 1533 (49.8%) contracts and international contracts
contained the rule in 106 of 192 (55.2%) contracts. The American
rule's greater prominence in international contracts was not statisti-
cally significant (p=0.161).143 The international-contract results are
not sensitive to including California-rule contracts.
The similarity between domestic and international contracts per-
sists in comparable contract types across the two panels in Table 6.
Asset sale or purchase contracts, merger agreements, and securities
140 See supra Part I.B.
141 See infra Part W.B.
142 See infra Appendix Table Al.
143 See supra note 137.
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TABLE 5: FREQUENCY OF ATrORNEY-FEE CLAUSES, BY CONTRACT TYPE
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
Asset sale/purchase no. 117 126 1 12 43 299
% 39.1% 42.1% 0.3% 4.0% 14.4% 100.0%
Bond indentures no. 53 0 96 5 0 154
% 34.4% 0.0% 62.3% 3.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Credit commitments no. 97 5 0 112 1 215
% 45.1% 2.3% 0.0% 52.1% 0.5% 100.0%
Employment contracts no. 52 37 1 19 0 109
% 47.7% 33.9% 0.9% 17.4% 0.0% 100.0%
Licensing no. 19 21 0 3 3 46
% 41.3% 45.7% 0.0% 6.5% 6.5% 100.0%
Mergers no. 184 140 0 52 34 410
% 44.9% 34.1% 0.0% 12.7% 8.3% 100.0%
Pooling & servicing no. 85 4 0 72 8 169
% 50.3% 2.4% 0.0% 42.6% 4.7% 100.0%
Securities purchase no. 199 157 2 57 27 442
% 45.0% 35.5% 0.5% 12.9% 6.1% 100.0%
Security agreements no. 10 4 0 21 0 35
% 28.6% 11.4% 0.0% 60.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Settlements no. 30 35 0 5 1 71
% 42.3% 49.3% 0.0% 7.0% 1.4% 100.0%
Trust agreements no. 2 1 1 41 0 45
% 4.4% 2.2% 2.2% 91.1% 0.0% 100.0%
Underwriting no. 22 325 0 5 0 352
% 6.3% 92.3% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 100.0%
Total no. 870 855 101 404 117 2347
% 37.1% 36.4% 4.3% 17.2% 5.0% 100.0%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 to June 30,2002,
for all contract types other than mergers andJanuary 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc.
discretion.
purchase contracts had the greatest numbers of international deals,
yet no striking difference emerged in their rates of specifying the
American or English rules.
We hypothesized that we would observe loser-pay clauses less
often in contracts that provide for mandatory arbitration. Appendix
Table A2 reports results for contracts with and without arbitration
clauses.'44 Our hypothesis is refuted because those agreeing to arbi-
tration tend to prefer, rather than avoid, the English rule. If one
again limits the sample to contracts choosing either the American or
English rule, contracts without arbitration clauses specified the Ameri-
can rule in 789 of 1509 (52.3%) contracts and arbitration-clause con-
tracts specified the American rule in 78 of 213 (36.6%) contracts.
144 See infra Appendix Table A2.
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TABLE 6: FREQUENCY OF A-rroRNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
BY CONTRACT TYPE AND INTERNATIONAL STATUS
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
A. Domestic contracts
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no.
Mergers no.
Pooling & servicing no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no.
Trust agreements no.
Underwriting no.
Total no.
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no,
Mergers no.
Pooling & servicing no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no.
Underwriting no.
Total no.
92 114 1 10 36 253
36.4% 45.1%
51 0
34.0% 0.0%
87 5
44.4% 2.6%
47 37
45.2% 35.6%
14 15
40.0% 42.9%
167 121
45.5% 33.0%
84 4
50.3% 2.4%
162 128
44.0% 34.8%
10 4
29.4% 11.8%
26 28
44.1% 47.5%
2 1
4.4% 2.2%
22 312
6.5% 92.3%
764 769
36.1% 36.3%
B.
25 12
54.3% 26.1%
2 0
50.0% 0.0%
10 0
52.6% 0.0%
5 0
100.0% 0.0%
5 6
45.5% 54.5%
17 19
39.5% 44.2%
1 0
50.0% 0.0%
37 29
50.7% 39.7%
0 0
0.0% 0.0%
4 7
33.3% 58.3%
0 13
0.0% 92.9%
106 86
46.1% 37.4%
0.4% 4.0% 14.2% 100.0%
94 5 0 150
62.7% 3.3% 0.0% 100.0%
0 103 1 196
0.0% 52.6% 0.5% 100.0%
1 19 0 104
1.0% 18.3% 0.0% 100.0%
0 3 3 35
0.0% 8.6% 8.6% 100.0%
0 46 33 367
0.0% 12.5% 9.0% 100.0%
0 71 8 167
0.0% 42.5% 4.8% 100.0%
2 52 24 368
0.5% 14.1% 6.5% 100.0%
0 20 0 34
0.0% 58.8% 0.0% 100.0%
0 4 1 - 59
0.0% 6.8% 1.7% 100.0%
1 41 0 45
2.2% 91.1% 0.0% 100.0%
0 4 0 338
0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 100.0%
99 378 106 2116
4.7% 17.9% 5.0% 100.0%
International contracts
0 2 7 46
0.0% 4.3% 15.2% 100.0%
2 0 0 4
50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0 9 0 19
0.0% 47.4% 0.0% 100.0%
0 0 0 5
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0 0 0 11
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0 6 1 43
0.0% 14.0% 2.3% 100.0%
0 1 0 2
0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0 4 3 73
0.0% 5.5% 4.1% 100.0%
0 1 0 1
0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0 1 0 12
0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 100.0%
0 1 0 14
0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 100.0%
2 25 11 230
0.9% 10.9% 4.8% 100.0%
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Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from january 2002 toJune 30, 2002, for all
contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. - number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. = discretion.
International contracts are those without a U.S. party.
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The American rule thus was significantly (p<o.oO1)1 45 less prominent
in contracts specifying arbitration than in other contracts. The prefer-
ence for the English rule in arbitration-clause contracts is a consistent
pattern even when one controls for contract type. Contract types with
a reasonably large number of agreements containing arbitration
clauses-asset sale or purchase, employment, mergers, and securities
purchase-show lower rates of American-rule use compared to con-
tracts of the same types not containing arbitration clauses. The arbi-
tration-clause results are not sensitive to the inclusion of California-
rule contracts.
Table 7 reports the association between attorney-fee clauses and
relational contract status, with the relational categorization of con-
tract types coded as described in Part I.C.146 Table 7's first two rows
suggest a modest preference for the English rule in nonrelational con-
tracts. The most distinctive results are the low rate, 12.4%, at which
relational contracts specify the English rule and the high rate, 39.6%,
at which relational contracts specify that one company pays fees. This
asymmetry is attributable to the credit contracts that we treat as rela-
tional, in which financial institutions often obtain one-way fee obliga-
tions that favor lenders. 147 This tendency supports the hypothesis that
relational contractors tend to favor the American rule.
But this result is sensitive to contracts subject to the California-fee
rule. Although only about 10% of relational contracts in other states
designate the English rule, 42% of relational contracts subject to the
California rule designate the English rule. The California-rule juris-
dictions were less likely to specify a one-company-pays rule. About
29% of California-rule-jurisdiction relational contracts specify that
one company pay fees, compared to about 40% of relational contracts
in non-California-rule jurisdictions.
Table 8 reports the distribution of attorney-fee clauses by degree
of standardization, which-as described in Part I.C-is classified as
low, medium, or high. Since standardization does not vary within con-
tract type, we only report the results aggregated by standardization.
145 See supra note 137.
146 Coding contracts' relational status can be imprecise. A settlement, for example,
may terminate a short-term or long-term relation, or it may promote a continued relation.
We crudely coded for relational status based on contract categories, with the following
contract categories coded as more likely to be relational: credit commitments, employ-
ment, licensing, pooling and service agreements, and security agreements; and the follow-
ing categories coded as less likely to be relational: asset sale or purchase, bond indentures,
mergers, securities purchase agreements, settlements, and underwritings. We omitted
trust agreements from the sample for purposes of the analysis of relational contracts be-
cause the relational status for these contracts is insufficiently clear.
147 Cf Katz, supra note 9, at 66 (drawing attention to the use of one-way fee shifting in
some standardized contracts, which usually operate in favor of the drafting party).
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TABLE 7: FREQUENCY OF ArrORNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
By RELATIONAL CONTRACT STATUS
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
Nonrelational no. 605 783 99 136 105 1728
% 35.0% 45.3% 5.7% 7.9% 6.1% 100.0%
Relational no. 263 71 1 227 12 574
% 45.8% 12.4% 0.2% 39.6% 2.1% 100.0%
Total no. 868 854 100 363 117 2302
% 37.7% 37.1% 4.3% 15.8% 5.1% 100.0%
Source. SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 toJune 30, 2002,
for all contract types other than mergers andJanuary 2002 toJuly 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. =
discretion. Relational contracts: credit commitments, employment, licensing, pooling and ser-
vice agreements, security agreements. Nonrelational contracts: asset sales, bond indentures,
mergers, securities purchase agreements, settlements, underwritings. Excludes trust agree-
ments.
Table 8 also shows no strong preference for the American or En-
glish rule by degree of standardization. The rate of choosing one of
the rules varies by 7.3% or less across standardization levels. Highly
standardized contract types have some tendency, however, to have a
more variable distribution of fee rules. About 86% of the least stan-
dardized (the "low" rows) contracts employ the American or English
rule, while only about 63% of the most standardized (the "high" rows)
contracts employ either rule. 48 If one divides fee rules into the Amer-
ican rule and all others, the difference in American rule use across
standardization levels is highly statistically significant (p<0.001).149
This result indicates that the American rule has a diminished role in
the most highly standardized contracts. The standardization results
are not sensitive to including California-rule contracts.
We hypothesized that the English rule would be more prominent
in contracts waiving jury trials. Appendix Table A3 shows fee-clause
use as a function of the presence of jury-trial waiver, controlling for
type of contract.150 Parties used both the English and American rules
less frequently in contracts where they waived jury trial than in con-
tracts where they did not. Overall, 37.5% of contracts not waiving jury
trial specified the American rule and 38.7% of nonwaiver contracts
specified the English rule. These rates exceed the rates of contracts
148 The difference diminishes if one includes as employing the English rule the 10% of
highly standardized contracts that employ the English rule with discretion. Including the
discretionary clauses makes the use of the English rule similar in low- and high-standardiza-
tion classes of contracts. But that qualification does not affect the diminished role of the
American rule in highly standardized contracts.
149 See supra note 137.
150 See infra Appendix Table A3.
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TABLE 8: FREQUENCY OF ATORNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
By DEGREE OF STANDARDIZATION
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
Low no. 101 93 1 27 4 226
% 44.7% 41.2% 0.4% 12.0% 1.8% 100.0%
Medium no. 500 423 3 121 104 1151
% 43.4% 36.8% 0.3% 10.5% 9.0% 100.0%
High no. 269 339 97 256 9 970
% 27.7% 35.0% 10.0% 26.4% 0.9% 100.0%
Total no. 870 855 101 404 117 2347
% 37.1% 36.4% 4.3% 17.2% 5.0% 100.0%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 tojune 30, 2002,
for all contract types other than mergers andjanuary 2002 toJuly 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. =
discretion. High-standardization contracts: bond indentures, credit commitments, pooling and
servicing agreements, security agreements, trust agreements, underwriting agreements. Medi-
um-standardization contracts: asset sale/purchase agreements, merger contracts, securities
purchase agreements. Low-standardization contracts: employment contracts, settlements, licens-
ing agreements.
specifying the American and English rules in contracts that waived
jury trials, 35.5% and 27.3%, respectively. Parties or attorneys who go
to the trouble to opt out of jury trial are more likely to specify an
attorney-fee rule other than the two dominant rules.
For contract types with at least twenty observations under both
jury-clause conditions, results varied.15' Parties to asset sale or
purchase contracts who waived jury trial preferred the English rule
over the American rule. In nonwaiver contracts, 41.1% of asset sale or
purchase contracts used the American rule, while 40.3% used the En-
glish rule. In jury-waiver contracts, 27.5% of asset sale or purchase
contracts used the American rule and 52.5% used the English rule.
Credit commitments' waiver contracts tended to flee the American
rule in favor of one company paying fees. In nonwaiver contracts,
60.5% of credit-commitment contracts used the American rule and
34.2% used a one-way fee rule. In credit commitment waiver con-
tracts, 36.7% used the American rule and 61.9% used a one-way fee
rule. Merger agreements did not noticeably vary by waiver clause. Se-
curities purchase waiver contracts migrated away from the American
rule and toward the English rule. Of nonwaiver contracts, 50.3% used
the American rule, while 32.2% used the English rule. Of securities
purchase contracts waiving jury trial, 31.1% used the American rule
and 44.3% used the English rule. The jury-trial waiver results are not
sensitive to the inclusion of California-rule contracts.
151 See id.
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As noted above, New York law dominated the choice of law in the
contracts in our sample.152 Although we have no reason to believe
that the seemingly efficient ex ante choice-of-law rule should be asso-
ciated with a particular attorney-fee clause, the choice of New York law
may affect some of the results.153 We therefore assess whether fee-
clause patterns vary with choice of law by reporting results separately
for contracts designating New York law and contracts selecting other
governing laws. Table 9 shows the pattern of fee clauses as a function
of contract type. Panel A shows the results for New York law contracts
and Panel B shows the results for contracts designating other law
choices. We excluded contracts that did not specify a choice of law.
The "total" rows for the two panels suggest no substantial preference
for the American rule or the English rule based on designating New
York law. Of contracts designating New York law, 34.7% chose the
American rule and 37.6% the English rule. Of contracts designating
non-New York governing law, 38.0% selected the American rule and
35.5% the English rule.
In Table 9, the results by contract type show that the totals over-
simplify the fee-clause pattern. Underwriting contracts, by far the
largest category of contracts designating New York law, overwhelm-
ingly chose the English rule. If one excludes underwriting contracts,
46.9% of contracts designating New York law chose the American rule
and only 14.3% of New York contracts chose the English rule.
Nonunderwriting contracts that did not designate New York law chose
the American rule in 38.6% of contracts and the English rule in
34.5% of contracts. Thus, New York contracts shunned the English
rule in favor of other fee provisions. This pattern persisted in asset
sale or purchase, licensing, and settlement contracts, areas that likely
use standard forms least often.
We hypothesized that fee clauses may vary by industry, either be-
cause of the nature of contracts in an industry or because of common
practice within an industry. Appendix Table A4 reports the pattern of
fee clauses by industry and suggests that fee-clause type is not strongly
associated with industry.154 No industry had as much as 50% of con-
tracts specifying either the American rule or the English rule.
D. Regression Results
As shown above, several variables contribute to the attorney-fee-
clause pattern. We therefore employ regression models to explore
the simultaneous influence of multiple factors. Although more than
one dependent variable and more than one model are reasonable
152 See Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight to New York, supra note 1, at 1478.
153 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
154 See infra Appendix Table A4.
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TABLE 9: FREQUENCY OF ATToRNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
BY CONTRACT TYPE AND GOVERNING LAw
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
A. New York law chosen
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no.
Mergers no.
Pooling & servicing no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no.
Trust agreements no.
Underwriting no.
Total no.
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no.
Mergers no,
Pooling & servicing no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no.
Trust agreements no.
Underwriting no.
Total no.
42 18
53.2% 22.8%
47 0
34.3% 0.0%
61 1
59.2% 1.0%
6 3
50.0% 25.0%
5 5
50.0% 50.0%
36 17
52.2% 24.6%
65 4
44.5% 2.7%
88 59
47.6% 31.9%
7 1
33.3% 4.8%
8 3
61.5% 23.1%
1 1
16.7% 16.7%
19 305
5.8% 93.0%
385 417
34.7% 37.6%
B.
75 108
34.1% 49.1%
6 0
35.3% 0.0%
36 4
32.1% 3.6%
46 34
47.4% 35.1%
14 16
38.9% 44.4%
99 92
39.8% 36.9%
20 0
87.0% 0.0%
111 98
43.2% 38.1%
3 3
21.4% 21.4%
22 32
37.9% 55.2%
1 0
2.6% 0.0%
3 20
12.5% 83.3%
436 407
38.0% 35.5%
0
0.0%
86
62.8%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
0.5%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
16.7%
0
0.0%
88
7.9%
New York law
1
0.5%
10
58.8%
0
0.0%
1
1.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
0.4%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
13
6 13 79
7.6% 16.5% 100.0%
4 0 137
2.9% 0.0% 100.0%
41 0 103
39.8% 0.0% 100.0%
3 0 12
25.0% 0.0% 100.0%
0 0 10
0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
9 7 69
13.0% 10.1% 100.0%
69 8 146
47.3% 5.5% 100.0%
27 10 185
14.6% 5.4% 100.0%
13 0 21
61.9% 0.0% 100.0%
2 0 13
15.4% 0.0% 100.0%
3 0 6
50.0% 0.0% 100.0%
4 0 328
1.2% 0.0% 100.0%
181 38 1109
16.3% 3.4% 100.0%
not chosen
6 30 220
2.7% 13.6% 100.0%
1 0 17
5.9% 0.0% 100.0%
71 1 112
63.4% 0.9% 100.0%
16 0 97
16.5% 0.0% 100.0%
3 3 36
8.3% 8.3% 100.0%
37 21 249
14.9% 8.4% 100.0%
3 0 23
13.0% 0.0% 100.0%
30 17 257
11.7% 6.6% 100.0%
8 0 14
57.1% 0.0% 100.0%
3 1 58
5.2% 1.7% 100.0%
38 0 39
97.4% 0.0% 100.0%
1 0 24
4.2% 0.0% 100.0%
217 73 1146
1.1% 18.9% 6.4% 100.0%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 to June 30, 2002, for all
contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. = discretion.
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candidates to explore,1 5 5 we simplify the analysis by employing a di-
chotomous dependent variable equal to "1" if a contract specifies the
American rule on fees and equal to "0" if the contract specifies an-
other fee rule, including the English rule. We thus model associations
with selecting the American rule rather than associations with a more
detailed fee-clause pattern.
Table 10 reports three regression models. The first two models
are logistic regression models with robust standard errors. Model (1)
uses as explanatory variables dummy variables for each contract type,
with merger contracts as the reference category. It also includes
dummy variables for arbitration clauses, jury-trial waiver clauses, non-
U.S. party status, New York as the choice of law, and the California
rule imposing symmetric fee obligations. We code these five variables
at the individual contract level. Variables coded at the contract-type
level-relational contract status and standardization-cannot be in-
cluded in Model (1) because of multicollinearity with the contract
types. 156 Model (2) addresses this limitation by foregoing use of the
individual contract-type dummy variables and adding variables, con-
structed from the contract types, for relational status and standardiza-
tion. Model (3) is a multilevel logistic regression model using random
intercepts for contract types. An advantage of the multilevel model is
that it allows accounting for variation across contract type through
random effects but also allows predictors at the contract-type level. 5 7
Models (2) and (3) exclude trust agreements because we did not code
relational contract status for them. The regression models should be
viewed with caution, as some of the explanatory variables are not ex-
ogenous. For example, a positive association exists between the pres-
ence of arbitration clauses and jury-trial-waiver clauses.158 We report
these factors for their contribution to assessing whether the relations
described above persist when accounting for multiple contract
characteristics.
The results in Table 10 are consistent with the nonregression re-
sults in Part III.C. In Model (1) of Table 10, employment contracts
155 For example, one might use multinornial logit models in which the dependent
variable could be coded to allow for multiple outcomes corresponding to different ob-
served-fee clauses.
156 Multicollinearity can result in instability of regression coefficients, which can ob-
scure the effects of individual variables. See, e.g., RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MOD-
ERN REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 79, 218 (1986).
157 See ANDREw GELMAN &JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MUL-
TILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 246 (2007) ("[Multilevel models allow aiccounting for in-
dividual- and group-level variation in estimating group-level regression coefficients."). The
number of groups (types of contracts) in our data is not very large. For a discussion on
using multilevel models in relation to the number of groups or the number of observations
within a group, see id. at 275-76.
158 See Eisenberg & Miller, Do juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 552-54.
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TABLE 10: REGRESSION MODELS OF CONTRACTS SPECIFYING THE
AMERICAN RULE ON FEES
Asset sale/purchase
Bond indentures
Credit commitments
Employment contracts
Licensing
Pooling service
Securities purchase
Security agreements
Settlements
Trust agreements
Underwriting
Non-U.S. party
Arbitration clause
Jury-trial-waiver clause
California rule
New York law governs
Relational contract
Standardization
Number of contracts
Number of groups
Pseudo r-squared
Proportionate reduction in error
2249
0.110
4.9%
0.160***
(0.026)
-0.147***
(0.020)
2204
0.042
-0.4%
0.127
(0.085)
-0.110**
(0.053)
2204
11
0.6%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 toJune 30, 2002,
for all contract types other than mergers and january 2002 toJuly 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note: Models (1) and (2) show the marginal effects of logistic regression models with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Model (3) shows the marginal effects of the fixed effects portion
of a multilevel model with random intercepts for contract type. Merger agreements are the
reference category for contract types in Model (1). Models (2) and (3) exclude trust agree-
ments because their relational contract status was not coded. Proportionate reduction in error is
relative to a model that always forecasts rejection of the American rule.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.0
have the largest positive coefficient of the contract types and are thus
most likely to employ the American rule, similar to the results shown
in Table 5; Model (1) is different only in controlling for non-U.S.
party status and the presence of arbitration clauses and jury-trial-
waiver clauses. Since Models (1) and (2) report marginal effects, we
365
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Dependent variable = American rule specified
-0.059
(0.034)
-0.162***
(0.034)
0.008
(0.042)
0.061
(0.056)
-0.020
(0.068)
-0.044
(0.044)
-0.014
(0.033)
-0.137**
(0,059)
-0.024
(0.058)
-0.313***
(0.017)
-0.396***
(0.017)
0.083** 0.111** 0.078**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.033)
-0.141*** -0.164*** -0.156***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.035)
-0.120*** -0.048* -0.113***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
-0.101** -0.111** -0.109**
(0.032) (0.038) (0.039)
0.070** 0.007 0.063**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
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can interpret the reported coefficients as the marginal change in the
probability of a contract specifying the American rule as a dummy va-
riable changes from zero to one. Underwriting agreements and trust
agreements are the least likely to use the American rule, with
probabilities of specifying the rule reduced by 39.6% or 31.3%, re-
spectively, compared to merger agreements.
For variables other than contract types, the previous tabular re-
sults also persist. As suggested by Table 9, once we control for con-
tract type, contracts specifying New York law tend to use the American
rule. As suggested by Table 4 and California Civil Code section 1717,
contracts subject to the California rule are about 11% less likely to use
the American rule than are contracts not subject to the rule. As sug-
gested by Table 6, non-U.S. party status is associated in all models with
use of the American rule. As suggested by Appendix Table A2, the
presence of an arbitration clause is associated in all models with rejec-
tion of the American rule. As suggested by Appendix Table A3, the
presence of ajury-trial-waiver clause is negatively associated with use of
the American rule. As suggested by Table 7, relational contract status
is associated with acceptance of the American rule. But note that this
effect is not statistically significant159 in Model (3), which also ac-
counts for contract type. So the stronger association between rela-
tional contract status and the American rule in Model (2) is likely due
to the fact that this model does not account for contract type. As sug-
gested by Table 8, increased standardization is associated with re-
jecting the American rule.
At least one source of nonindependence might artificially reduce
the standard errors in Table 10 and therefore lead to spurious signifi-
cance levels: several firms appear multiple times in the data. The
prominence of asset-backed financing during the period we studied
led financial institutions to appear particularly frequently. 60 For ex-
ample, Credit Suisse First Boston appears as the reporting party in
twenty-two contracts, and several other firms appear multiple times.
159 See supra note 137 for an explanation of statistical significance. In the regression
context, the null hypothesis is that the regression coefficient for an explanatory variable
(in this case, the relational contract dummy variable) is equal to zero. A regression coeffi-
cient equal to zero corresponds to no association between the explanatory variable and the
variable sought to be explained (in this case, whether the contract specifies the American
rule). A regression coefficient that differs from zero at a statistically significant level indi-
cates that it is unlikely that there is no association between the explanatory variable and the
variable sought to be explained, given the observed data sample.
160 See Sumit Agarwal, Jacqueline Barrett, Crystal Cun & Mariacristina De Nardi, The
Asset-Backed Securities Markets, the Crisis, and TALF 34 EcoN. PERSP. 101, 101 (2010), available
at http://qa.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/economic-perspectives/2 0 10/4
qtr201 lpartl-agarwal-barrett cun_denardi.pdf ("ABS issuance grew steadily, increasing
liquidity and reducing the cost of financing. From an annual issuance of $10 billion in
1986, the ABS market grew to an annual issuance of $893 billion in 2006, its peak in the
U.S.").
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We ran Models (1) and (2) with standard errors clustered by firm,
producing essentially the same results as in Table 10. The significance
of error for jury-trial waiver increased to p=0.101 from its reported
significance at the 0.1 level 61 in the Table 10.
Iv
DISCUSSION
We first discuss the implications of the high rate of American-rule
rejection. We then discuss the results in relation to Part I.C's hypothe-
ses and suggest limitations on efficiency-based inferences due to the
nature of our data.
A. Hypotheses Confirmed and Not Confirmed
The high rejection rate of the American rule confirms our first
hypothesis: that parties will tend to opt out of the American rule. Par-
ties opted out of the American rule at a much higher rate than they
opted out of two other default rules. Table 3 shows that parties ac-
cepted the default rule of access to court in 89.4% of contracts, the
default rule of access to jury trial in 80.1% of contracts, and the de-
fault American rule on fees in only 37.1% of contracts.162 These dif-
ferences persisted for specific contract types. The three contract
categories that were least likely to be based on a simple markup of
prior contract forms-employment, licensing, and settlements-con-
firm the breadth of differences. These three categories show accept-
ance of access to courts in, respectively, 63.1%, 66.7%, and 83.3% of
contracts.1s3 They show acceptance of access to jury trial in, respec-
tively, 61.3%, 60.4%, and 70.8% of contracts.16 4
The rejection rate of the default American rule illuminates the
high acceptance rates of the arbitration and jury-trial default rules
previously demonstrated in these contracts.165 Their high acceptance
rates can no longer be interpreted as parties merely failing to over-
come the inertia of default provisions; shunning arbitration and em-
bracing jury trials can now more plausibly be interpreted as evidence
of the normative appeal of courts and juries.
The data confirmed other predictions. Relational contracts
tended to be associated with the American rule, as we predicted, al-
though this pattern was significant in only one of two regression mod-
161 See supra note 159.
162 See supra Table 3.
163 See Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 15, at 351.
164 See Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 15, at 553. These percent-
ages treat contracts with arbitration clauses as belonging to the class of contracts that waive
jury trial.
165 See supra Table 3.
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els.166 We interpret this result as suggesting that parties in relational
contracts tend to trust one another and prefer to avoid litigation that
calls attention to which one of them was in the wrong from a legal
point of view. This may well be the efficient outcome with respect to
fee clauses for such contracts.
We also predicted that loser-pays rules would be more frequently
observed in contracts waiving jury trial. The data in Table 10 con-
firmed this: jury waivers were negatively associated with the American
rule in bivariate analysis and in the regression models.'67 This pattern
may be due to the parties' greater confidence that judges will rule in
their favor, and thus their greater willingness to trade off the liability
of paying their opponent's fee in the event of a bad result in exchange
for the right to have their own attorney fees paid by the adversary if
they win. Since jury-trial waivers are relatively rare, their presence,
like the presence of arbitration clauses, is likely associated with more
detailed focus on dispute-resolution provisions and less likely attribu-
table to using a prior transaction's documents. This conscious choice
suggests that the negative association with the American rule is evi-
dence of the English rule's perceived efficiency. But Appendix Table
A3 shows that the low standardization contract areas-employment,
licensing, and settlement-inconsistently preferred the English
rule. 168 This inconsistency, which differs from the arbitration-clause
results, suggests that the association between use of the English rule
and use of jury-trial waivers is less strong evidence of the perceived
efficiency of the English rule than is the association based on the pres-
ence of an arbitration clause.
Several of our hypotheses were disconfirmed. We predicted that
foreign parties would tend to demand fee arrangements conforming
to their home country practices and therefore that contracts with for-
eign parties would tend to opt out of the American rule. Table 10
reveals that the opposite was the case: contracts with non-U.S. parties
were significantly more likely to utilize the American rule. We conjec-
ture that in the context of contracts with foreign parties, background
default rules-the American rule for the domestic party and the En-
glish rule for the foreign party-clash. The parties are less likely to
use a particular clause by default. In this perspective, lower use of the
English rule familiar to one party may be evidence that parties can
overcome background conditions when efficiency demands it. Alter-
natively, international companies may accept the American rule in
contracts with U.S. parties because they believe that American courts
166 See supra Table 10.
167 See supra Table 10.
168 See infra Appendix Table A3.
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lack experience in applying the English rule, which requires that one
party be deemed to be right.1 6 9
We expected that parties who entered contracts with mandatory
arbitration clauses would prefer the American rule because determin-
ing which party prevailed is often impossible in arbitration. Our pre-
diction was disconfirmed: parties to contracts with arbitration clauses
turned out to be relatively more likely to opt out of the American
rule. 70 To the extent that arbitration-clause use, an unusual event, is
a reasonable proxy for the individual negotiation of dispute-resolution
terms, rather than mere acceptance of preexisting forms, background
conditions are a less persuasive explanation for fee-clause choice in
contracts with arbitration clauses than for other contracts.' 71 This
suggests that the arbitration-clause results, in contrast to the interna-
tional-contract-clause results, constitute evidence that parties tended
to regard the English rule as optimal. This inference is conditional on
arbitration-clause selection not correlating with some other factor that
points toward use of the English rule. The factor we hypothesized-
uncertainty about the prevailing party-pointed toward use of the
American rule, which suggests that the evidence from arbitration-
clause contracts is an even stronger indication that parties to these
contracts regarded the English rule as optimal.
We hypothesized that loser-pays provisions would be more fre-
quently observed in individually negotiated contracts and less fre-
quently observed in standardized contracts. Table 8 suggests that
highly standardized contracts tended to be associated with greater use
of the English rule. Regression models confirm this association, with
standardization significantly negatively associated with the American
rule: the more standardized the contract, the more likely the parties
were to reject the American rule.1' These results may be due to the
tendency of highly standardized contracts to involve loans in which
financial institutions insist that borrowers pay their fees in the event of
a dispute over repayment. 7" Table 5 supports this explanation be-
cause it shows that credit-commitment contracts and security agree-
ments have by far the highest rates (over 50%) of fee provisions under
which one party pays fees. Plausible inferences about perceived effi-
169 It is also possible, as Michael Frakes observed in commenting on this Article, that
psychological factors influence the nature of the arrangement selected.
170 See supra Table 10.
171 See Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 15, at 350-51, 351 tbl.2
(finding that approximately 89% of contracts do not mandate arbitration).
172 See supra Table 10.
173 See Stephen L. Sepinuck & Tina L. Stark, The Big Deal About the Fine Print: Negotiating
and Drafting Contractual Boilerplate, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. RxP. 848, 852 (2007) (indicating
that lenders frequently employ standardized contracts mandating that borrowers pay attor-
neys' fees regardless of the disposition of the case).
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ciency are difficult to derive from the fee-clause pattern in standard-
ized contracts. Their very standardization increases the likelihood
that fee clauses persist through the marking up of documents from
similar deals rather than through express focus on what is efficient for
a specific deal.' 74 On the other hand, we may conjecture that the
standardized terms evolved in response to efficiency-based considera-
tions and therefore tend to reflect generically efficient outcomes.
We also erroneously predicted that the distribution of fee clauses
would be more variable in less standardized contracts. Contrary to
our prediction, the variance in fee terms increased rather than de-
creased with standardization. 7 5 The result is a bit mysterious and not
easily explainable with reference to plausible conjectures about the
behavior of the parties.
B. Issues Specific to Contract Types
Our study confirms the hypothesis that fee provisions vary with
contract type, with statistically significant differences in fee arrange-
ments among the twelve contract categories.176 This result suggests
that features of the underlying business transactions are significant
drivers of fee arrangements. We offer some explanations specific to
certain contract types for the observed data. Further research into fee
provisions could elucidate additional features that may explain the ob-
served variance among types of contract.
As shown in Table 5, underwriting agreements are distinctive.
Parties to underwriting agreements chose the American rule in only
6.3% of the contracts and the English rule in 92.3%. This pattern
likely reflects the dynamics of legal exposure in this kind of contract
and could also suggest fragility in distinguishing among fee clauses.
Litigation relating to underwriting contracts usually involves a
third party suing for alleged misrepresentations in a securities-registra-
tion disclosure document.17 7 Information related to most misrepre-
sentations is likely to be more readily available to the issuing company
than to the underwriter. 78  This asymmetrical knowledge suggests
that issuer responsibility for liability to third parties, including attor-
174 See Andrew A. Schwartz, A "Standard Clause Analysis" of the Frustration Doctrine and the
Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REv. 789, 796 (2010) (suggesting standardized
clauses are an efficient way of employing reusable terms in commercial agreements).
175 See supra Table 8.
176 See supra Table 5.
177 See Candida P. Jos6, Note, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Disproportionate
Liability Imputed to Accountants, 27 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 565, 566, 568-69 (2002).
178 Compare id. at 580-82 (describing the underwriter's basic duties as "market[ing] the
issuer's securities for distribution among investors"), withJennifer O'Hare, Institutional In-
vestors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
1996 Wis. L. REv. 217, 242 ("[U]nderwriters are subjected to liability because they hold
themselves out as professionals who are able to evaluate the financial condition of the
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ney fees, may be more efficient than underwriter liability. For under-
writing agreements, obligating the issuer to potential indemnitee's
attorney fees may therefore be value maximizing.
The contracts in our data set confirm this pattern. For example,
an underwriting agreement for Virginia Electric and Power Company
states:
The Company agrees to indemnify and hold harmless each Under-
wnter ... against any and all losses . . . and to reimburse each such
Underwriter . .. for any legal or other expenses (including, to the
extent hereinafter provided, reasonable outside counsel fees) in-
curred by them in connection with investigating or defending any
such losses . . . insofar as such losses . . . arise out of or are based
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact contained in the Registration Statement or the Prospec-
tus . . . or the omission or alleged omission to state therein a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading. . .19
The indemnity does not reach liability based on information provided
by underwriters.'8 0o
Conversely, underwriters may generate liability in circumstances
in which the underwriter has superior knowledge.1 8 1 Issuers often ob-
tain indemnity clauses from underwriters to cover such events.1 8 2 The
above Virginia Electric and Power Company underwriting agreement
also provides:
Each Underwriter agrees . . . to indemnify and hold harmless The
Company ... against any and all losses . .. and to reimburse each of
them for any legal or other expenses (including, to the extent here-
inafter provided, reasonable outside counsel fees) incurred by them
in connection with investigating or defending any such losses, . . .
insofar as such losses . . . arise out of or are based upon any untrue
statement or alleged untrue statement of a material fact contained
in the Registration Statement or the Prospectus .. . or the omission
or alleged omission to state therein a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading if such statement or omission was made in reliance upon
information furnished herein or in writing to the Company by or on
behalf of such Underwriter ... .18
issuer." (quoting McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 646 (N.D. Cal. 1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
179 Va. Elec. & Power Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. I § 9(a) (Jan. 29, 2002).
180 See id.
181 See Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer's Guide to the Operation of Underwriting Syndicates, 26
NEw ENG. L. REv, 319, 326-27 (1991).
182 See id.
183 See Va. Elec. & Power Co., supra note 179, at Ex. I § 9(b). The effect of mutual
indemnification clauses in underwriting agreements is questionable. A review of indem-
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Thus, in this frequent fee-clause arrangement, the issuer agrees
to pay the underwriter's attorney fees if liability stems from issuer be-
havior, but the underwriter pays the issuer's fees if liability is based on
underwriter behavior.184 This arrangement is akin to the English rule
and is coded as such in our data, although the contracts implement it
through mutual one-way fee-shifting provisions. This version of a
loser-pays provision may be value maximizing because in these types
of cases, the allocation of responsibility for harm is clear: the company
is responsible for the harm when the underwriter is held liable for
actions undertaken in reliance on the company's false representa-
tions; and the underwriter is responsible for the harm when the com-
pany is held liable for actions undertaken in reliance on the
underwriter's representations.185 Where responsibility for harm is
clear, imposing the full cost of the harm-including the costs of the
other party's defense in litigation-on the responsible party makes
sense. 186
nity provisions for underwriters concluded that "the majority of the federal courts of ap-
peals is in favor of limiting the availability of indemnity in securities suits." In re Colonial
BancGroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 2:09cv104-MHT, 2010 WL 119290, at *3 (M.D. Ala.Jan. 7,
2010). The likelihood of an enforceable indemnity is especially low when the underwriter
or issuing company is not free from fault. See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478,
485 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Denying claims for indemnification would encourage underwriters to
exhibit the degree of reasonable care required by the 1933 and 1934 Acts." (citing Baker,
Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir. 1989))); Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1980)
("[P]ermitting indemnity would undermine the statutory purpose of assuring diligent per-
formance of duty and deterring negligence." (citing 3 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REcULAjATIoN
1831 (2d ed. 1961))); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir.
1969) (denying an underwriter's appeal seeking indemnity "where the underwriter ha[d]
committed a sin graver than ordinary negligence"); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 740 F.
Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Indemnification is not available as a matter of policy to
parties who have knowingly and willfully violated the federal securities laws." (quoting
Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962, 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (extending the holding in Globus to include ordinary negligence). But the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has suggested that indemnity may be un-
available even when the party seeking relief is factually innocent of the securities violation.
See King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1282 n.10 (7th Cir. 1989) ("It is difficult to see how a right
to indemnification for even innocent persons would serve the deterrent function which
underlies the statute."). Parties may be willing to include such clauses for what they are
worth, but doubts about their enforceability lower the stakes of granting indemnity and
blur the inferences about efficiency derivable from their existence in a contract. See Helen
S. Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution Clauses in Undenoriting Agreements, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 223, 231 (1986).
184 See Allen, supra note 181, at 32 6 -2 7 ("[E]ach of the underwriters severally indemni-
fies the issuer against liabilities arising out of material misrepresentations or omissions
from the registration statement and prospectus, but only to the extent that those misrepre-
sentations or omissions were made or omitted in reliance upon written information fur-
nished to the issuer by the underwriters . .
185 See id.
186 See In re Colonial BancGroup, 2010 WL 119290, at *3.
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But we could also reasonably code this common underwriting
contract fee pattern differently. The indemnity clauses quoted above
relate to untrue statements or omissions in connection with third-
party actions. In actions between issuers and underwriters that do not
involve third parties, standard underwriting agreements do not opt
out from the American rule.187 So, for example, if the issuer sues the
underwriter for failing to deliver proper underwriting services, the
American rule applies and coding these contracts as accepting the
American rule would not be unreasonable.
The fragility of coding extends one step further. Although the
indemnity clauses superficially appear to be symmetric, the actual risk
of issuers paying attorney fees is substantially higher than the risk of
underwriters paying attorney fees. Issuers have access to and supply
the public with much more material information than underwrit-
ers.' 88 Suits by third parties are more likely to be based on issuer be-
havior than on underwriter behavior. 89 The formally symmetric
indemnity provisions are, in economic reality, closer to one company,
the issuer, obligating itself to pay attorney fees. Coding the standard
underwriting contracts as English-rule contracts respects the symmetry
of the indemnity clauses and reflects the economic reality of third-
party reactions being the most likely sources of liability. But such cod-
ing downplays the application of the American rule to issuer-under-
writer disputes, however unlikely they may be, and downplays another
aspect of economic reality: the issuer's likely greater risk of exposure.
If one were to recode to the American rule the 325 underwriting
contracts shown in Table 5 as selecting the English rule, the American
rule would comprise 58% of the contracts choosing either the English
or American rules and 50% of all contracts. The American rule would
thus remain, by far, the most rejected of the three default dispute-
resolution clauses we have coded. Regardless of how one codes un-
derwriting contracts, the detailed express treatment of fees departs
from the standard American-rule treatment.
In the case of bond indentures, the English rule with discretion is
the dominant fee provision, accounting for 62.3% of the inden-
tures.o90 The dominance of the English rule with discretion for bond
indentures may well be attributable to the TIA's application to public
187 See Va. Elec. & Power Co., supra note 179, at Ex. 1 § 9.
188 See Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
245-46 (2009) (noting that the traditional "gatekeeper" role of the underwriter has dimin-
ished in recent years, in part due to the "speed with which new securities issues can be
brought to market," and that underwriters act primarily as "insurer[s] for disclosure
failure").
189 See id. at 241, 245-46.
190 See supra Table 5.
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debt indentures. 91 For example, a bond indenture of Medicis Phar-
maceutical Corporation allows courts to "assess reasonable costs, in-
cluding reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, against any party
litigant in [a] suit," as stated in the TIA.' 92 This clause is reasonably
characterized as adopting the English rule with discretion. But, con-
sistent with the TIA, the clause does not apply to suits brought by the
indenture trustee or by large debt holders.193 The observed fee provi-
sions thus incorporate the background norm established in the TIA.
The TIA does allow parties to opt out of this background rule.194
The fee agreements we observed, however, not only displayed a pat-
tern of not opting out of the norm but in fact showed that parties tend
to specifically restate the norm as part of their indenture. We may
infer, therefore, that parties consider this norm of the English rule
with discretion to be value maximizing, perhaps because it allows the
court to impose a fee sanction on small holders who bring nonmerito-
rious litigation in an effort to extract a settlement offer. On the other
hand, when the indenture trustee or large holders bring the lawsuit,
concern about frivolous or extortionate litigation is greatly mitigated.
In such cases, reversion to the default American rule, or to one-way
general indemnity by the issuer, may allow the trustee and large hold-
ers to be less hesitant to act against debt issuers.
These factors likely lead to the observed concentrations of partic-
ular fee-clause use. The broader point is that the observed fee ar-
rangements may reflect contract-specific factors that are not fully
captured by a simple taxonomy. Further research into specific con-
tract types may reveal other reasons for the observed variance in fee
clauses across contract types.
C. Limitations on Inferences
We close with caveats that may qualify the inferences that our re-
sults support.
1. Our data cover a particular sample of contracts: major com-
mercial contracts deemed to constitute or relate to material events for
publicly traded firms. Because of this specific focus, our results do not
necessarily translate to other contracts. For example, concerns about
frivolous litigation may be lower in the business-to-business contracts
we study than they would be in business-to-consumer contracts. The
191 See supra Part I.B.
192 See, e.g., Medicis Pharm. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 4-1 § 6.11 (June
6, 2002); see also Am. W. Holdings Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 4-15 § 4.14
(Jan. 31, 2002) ("[Sluch court may in its discretion assess reasonable costs, including rea-
sonable attorneys' fees, against any party litigant in [a] suit .... ).
193 See, e.g., Medicis Pharm. Corp., supra note 192; Am. W. Holdings Corp., supra note
192.
194 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(e) (2006).
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data are also cross-sectional; information for periods before and after
the first half of 2002 could differ. With respect to international con-
tracts, our sample is from a database limited to firms with U.S. public
offerings. This factor may affect whether the data support inferences
applicable to other international contracts.
2. Multiple factors may explain the fee-clause pattern, none of
which can be definitively ruled in or out from our data. For example,
our data do not allow us to identify whether the parties' revealed pref-
erences are due to a fee clause's perceived role in enhancing settle-
ment probability, reducing litigation expenditures, or other factors.
3. The fee-clause pattern may not necessarily represent optimal
contract terms if attorneys do not focus on fee clauses. Perhaps law-
yers negotiating contracts often do not actively consider fee clauses
and merely adopt the American rule by default or incorporate forms
with fee clauses without considering the implications of the relevant
provisions.
4. Even if attorneys do actively consider and negotiate fee provi-
sions, they will not necessarily arrive at efficient terms. A possible ex-
planation for the overall pattern's inconsistency is that drafters have
limited knowledge of fee-clause effects on contracting parties' behav-
ior; drafters do not know any better than others about what the
clauses' actual effects will be. 95 They have neither databases nor the
theoretical perspective of academics, who are themselves conflicted
about the effects of specific fee provisions.196 Drafters' incentives to
acquire knowledge of particular clauses' effects may be limited if the
anticipated transactions costs of bargaining prevent the parties from
achieving an optimal substantive result. Perhaps the attorney-fee allo-
cation is of de minimis importance because most cases do not gener-
ate disputes, and most disputes result in a settlement where the parties
are free to allocate fees as they like, regardless of contract provi-
sions.197 And no obvious market process exists that would drive out
less efficient clauses despite parties not knowing which those are.198
5. Even if fee clauses represent optimal terms between con-
tracting parties, they are not necessarily socially optimal if third-party
effects are important.199 Decisions about litigation involve externali-
195 See Katz, supra note 9, at 76-77 (discussing the unpredictable effect of fee clauses
on substantive behavior).
196 See supra Part I.A.2.
197 Some evidence suggests that in settlements, the standard rule is that each party
pays its own attorney, even when the jurisdiction administers an English rule for trials. See
Di PIETRo, CAms & KELLEY, supra note 33, at 51.
198 We thankJohn Leubsdorf for this point.
199 Cf. Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal
System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333-34 (1982) (claiming that private incentives to sue are
not necessarily coextensive with the interests of society at large).
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ties.200 The court system is subsidized, meaning that parties do not
pay the full social costs of litigating.201 Litigation thus imposes un-
compensated costs on the public. 202 On the other hand, litigation
also generates positive externalities by enhancing compliance with ef-
ficient laws and producing precedents to guide future conduct.203 If
the externalities are significant and not offsetting, the inferences from
our findings regarding the welfare qualities of different fee regimes
could be reduced.
6. The observed contract terms may not align with social welfare
if agency costs are significant (i.e., if the attorneys who negotiate and
draft contracts serve their own interests rather than their clients' inter-
ests). Attorney-compensation arrangements are potentially important
to attorneys' well-being (assuming that the same firm that negotiates
the contract will also conduct any ensuing litigation), and therefore
agency costs may skew the observed contract terms away from arrange-
ments that would maximize the joint welfare of the parties.
Notwithstanding these caveats, our approach offers valuable in-
formation pertinent to theoretical and public policy debates about op-
timal-fee provisions. Our evidence establishes a widespread practice
of parties opting out of background legal norms. That practice would
not exist if parties and their counsel considered the norms themselves
highly desirable. Even though contract drafters may not consider dis-
pute-resolution terms to be the most important items, these terms do
occupy the time and attention of counsel.204 The contracts them-
selves, moreover, are significant to the financial condition of SEC re-
porting companies, 205 creating an incentive for the companies to give
these terms attention. Attorney-compensation clauses appear in a sig-
nificant number of contracts likely to be individually negotiated, such
as employment contracts and settlement agreements.20 6 Even when
contracts are standardized-for example, pooling and servicing agree-
ments-sophisticated business lawyers have likely thoroughly reviewed
200 See Hylton, supra note 13, at 222 (arguing that "litigation costs borne by the parties
do not reflect all of marginal costs of litigation"); Shavell, supra note 199, at 333-34.
20 See Hylton, supra note 13, at 222 (noting that while parties pay for their attorneys'
time, they do not pay for the time of the judges, jurors, and court employees).
202 See id.
203 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-86
(1984) (discussing the social benefits that judicial adjudication provides but settlement
between parties cannot provide).
204 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 92, at 32 (discussing the various factors that business law-
yers should consider when drafting a dispute-resolution clause).
205 But cf Katz, supra note 9, at 67 (suggesting that the nondrafting party may fail to
notice a fee provision in a contract but acknowledging that this observation is concerned
with one-sided fee-shifting clauses).
206 See supra Table 5.
376 [Vol. 98:327
PUBIJC COMPANY CONTRACTS
and considered the templates. 207 Accordingly, the presence or ab-
sence of an attorney-compensation clause in sophisticated commercial
contracts likely often reflects considered judgments about what ar-
rangement best serves the joint interests of the parties.
CONCLUSION
This study of attorney-fee clauses in public company contracts
demonstrates a remarkable degree of opting out of the American rule
and into alternative regimes in which parties pay their counterparties'
fees under defined circumstances. This pattern contrasts markedly
with that observed for mandatory arbitration clauses and jury-trial
waivers, where sophisticated contracting parties tend not to opt out of
the background legal norm. We infer from the data that the Ameri-
can rule on attorney fees is often not an optimal regime for compen-
sating attorneys in disputes over important contracts among
sophisticated parties.
While the pattern of opting out of the American rule is clear, no
real consensus emerged as to which compensation system firms pre-
fer. The English rule was the most popular alternative, but we also
observed other arrangements, such as one-way fee-shifting clauses, in
a significant number of cases. The observed fee arrangements may
thus reflect contract-specific factors that are not fully captured by a
simple taxonomy. Further research into specific contract types may
reveal other reasons for the observed variance in fee clauses across
contract types.
207 Loser-pays clauses are found in widely available model contracts. See, e.g., Settle-
ment, Release, Covenant Not to Sue, Waiver and Non-Disclosure Agreement-Instinet
Group Inc. and Kenneth K. Marshall 1 18 (May 3, 2002), available at http://print.onecle.
com/contracts/instinet/marshall.sep2002.05.03.shtml ("The parties agree that, in any suit
brought by either party for breach of this Agreement by the other, the non-prevailing party
will be liable for the reasonable attorneys fees of the prevailing party.").
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TABLE Al: FREQUENCY OF ATrORNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
BY CONTRACT TYPE AND GOvERNING LAW
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng, rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no.
Mergers no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no,
Underwriting no.
Total no.
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no.
Mergers no.
Pooling & servicing no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no.
Trust agreements no.
Underwriting no.
Total no.
A. California rule applies
10 23 0 0 2 35
28.6% 65.7% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 100.0%
0 0 4 0 0 4
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
3 1 0 7 0 11
27.3% 9.1% 0.0% 63.6% 0.0% 100.0%
5 7 1 2 0 15
33.3% 46.7% 6.7% 13.3% 0.0% 100.0%
2 7 0 1 0 10
20.0% 70.0% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 100.0%
14 33 0 4 5 56
25.0% 58.9% 0.0% 7.1% 8.9% 100,0%
21 17 0 7 2 47
44.7% 36.2% 0.0% 14.9% 4.3% 100.0%
0 1 0 1 0 2
0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 9 0 1 0 11
9.1% 81.8% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 100.0%
1 0 0 0 0 1
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
57 98 5 23 9 192
29.7% 51.0% 2.6% 12.0% 4.7% 100.0%
B. California rule does not apply
107 103 1 12 41 264
40.5% 39.0% 0.4% 4.5% 15.5% 100.0%
53 0 92 5 0 150
35.3% 0.0% 61.3% 3.3% 0.0% 100.0%
94 4 0 105 1 204
46.1% 2.0% 0.0% 51.5% 0.5% 100.0%
47 30 0 17 0 94
50.0% 31.9% 0.0% 18.1% 0.0% 100.0%
17 14 0 2 3 36
47.2% 38.9% 0.0% 5.6% 8.3% 100.0%
122 77 0 42 23 264
46.2% 29.2% 0.0% 15.9% 8.7% 100.0%
85 4 0 72 8 169
50.3% 2.4% 0.0% 42.6% 4.7% 100.0%
178 140 2 50 25 395
45.1% 35.4% 0.5% 12.7% 6.3% 100.0%
10 3 0 20 0 33
30.3% 9.1% 0.0% 60.6% 0.0% 100.0%
29 26 0 4 1 60
48.3% 43.3% 0.0% 6.7% 1.7% 100.0%
2 1 1 41 0 45
4.4% 2.2% 2.2% 91.1% 0.0% 100.0%
21 325 0 5 0 351
6.0% 92.6% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 100.0%
765 727 96 375 102 2065
37.0% 35.2% 4.6% 18.2% 4.9% 100.0%
378
Source- SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span fromJanuary 2002 toJune 30, 2002, for all
contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note California rule of symmetric fee clauses applies to contracts governed by California, Oregon, and
Washington law; no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. =
discretion.
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TABLE A2: FREQUENCY OF ArroRNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
BY CONTRACT TYPE AND ARBITRATION CLAUSE PRESENCE
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
A. Without arbitration clause
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no.
Mergers no,
Pooling & servicing no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no.
Trust agreements no.
Underwriting no.
Total no.
Asset sale/purchase no.
Bond indentures no.
Credit commitments no.
Employment contracts no.
Licensing no.
Mergers no.
Securities purchase no.
Security agreements no.
Settlements no.
Underwriting no.
Total no.
99 96 1 10 33 239
41.4% 40.2% 0.4% 4.2% 13.8% 100.0%
52 0 96 5 0 153
34.0% 0.0% 62.7% 3.3% 0.0% 100.0%
93 5 0 110 1 209
44.5% 2A% 0.0% 52.6% 0.5% 100.0%
34 19 0 15 0 68
50.0% 27.9% 0.0% 22.1% 0.0% 100.0%
15 12 0 2 3 32
46.9% 37.5% 0.0% 6.3% 9.4% 100.0%
164 103 0 42 24 333
49.2% 30.9% 0.0% 12.6% 7.2% 100.0%
85 4 0 72 8 169
50.3% 2.4% 0.0% 42.6% 4.7% 100.0%
187 126 1 54 21 389
48.1% 32.4% 0.3% 1U.9% 5.4% 100.0%
10 3 0 20 0 33
30.3% 9.1% 0.0% 60.6% 0.0% 100.0%
27 27 0 4 1 59
45.8% 45.8% 0.0% 6.8% 1.7% 100.0%
2 1 1 41 0 45
4.4% 2.2% 2.2% 91.1% 0.0% 100.0%
21 324 0 5 0 350
6.0% 92.6% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 100.0%
789 720 99 380 91 2079
38.0% 34.6% 4.8% 18.3% 4.4% 100.0%
B. With arbitration clause
18 30 0 2 10 60
30.0% 50.0% 0.0% 3.3% 16.7% 100.0%
1 0 0 0 0 1
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
3 0 0 2 0 5
60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 100.0%
18 18 1 4 0 41
43.9% 43.9% 2.4% 9.8% 0.0% 100.0%
4 9 0 1 0 14
28.6% 64.3% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 100.0%
19 37 0 10 10 76
25.0% 48.7% 0.0% 13.2% 13.2% 100.0%
12 31 1 2 6 52
23.1% 59.6% 1.9% 3.8% 11.5% 100.0%
0 1 0 1 0 2
0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0%
3 8 0 1 0 12
25.0% 66.7% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 100.0%
0 1 0 0 0 1
0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
78 135 2 23 26 264
29.5% 51.1% 0.8% 8.7% 9.8% 100.0%
Source- SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 to June 30, 2002, for all
contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. = discretion.
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TABLE A3: FREQUENCY OF ATrORNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
BY CONTRACT TYPE AND JURY-TRIAL WAIVER
Eng. rule, One co.
Contract type Am. rule Eng. rule with disc. pays fees Other Total
A. No jury-trial waiver
Asset sale/purchase no. 106 104 1 12 35 258
% 41.1% 40.3% 0.4% 4.7% 13.6% 100.0%
Bond indentures no. 52 0 94 5 0 151
% 34.4% 0.0% 62.3% 3.3% 0.0% 100.0%
Credit commitments no. 46 4 0 26 0 76
% 60.5% 5.3% 0.0% 34.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Employment contracts no. 47 36 0 19 0 102
% 46.1% 35.3% 0.0% 18.6% 0.0% 100.0%
Licensing no. 18 19 0 2 2 41
% 43.9% 46.3% 0.0% 4.9% 4.9% 100.0%
Mergers no. 133 108 0 34 26 301
% 44.2% 35.9% 0.0% 11.3% 8.6% 100.0%
Pooling & servicing no. 83 4 0 68 8 163
% 50.9% 2.5% 0.0% 41.7% 4.9% 100.0%
Securities purchase no. 161 103 1 33 22 320
% 50.3% 32.2% 0.3% 10.3% 6.9% 100.0%
Security agreements no. 8 1 0 6 0 15
% 53.3% 6.7% 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Settlements no. 22 32 0 4 1 59
% 37.3% 54.2% 0.0% 6.8% 1.7% 100.0%
Trust agreements no. 2 1 1 40 0 44
% 4.5% 2.3% 2.3% 90.9% 0.0% 100.0%
Underwriting no. 22 311 0 4 0 337
% 6.5% 92.3% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Total no. 700 723 97 253 94 1867
% 37.5% 38.7% 5.2% 13.6% 5.0% 100.0%
B. Jury-trial waiver
Asset sale/purchase no. 11 21 0 0 8 40
% 27.5% 52.5% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 100.0%
Bond indentures no. 1 0 2 0 0 3
% 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Credit commitments no. 51 1 0 86 1 139
% 36.7% 0.7% 0.0% 61.9% 0.7% 100.0%
Employment contracts no. 5 1 1 0 0 7
% 71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
licensing no. 1 2 0 1 1 5
% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0%
Mergers no. 51 32 0 18 8 109
% 46.8% 29.4% 0.0% 16.5% 7.3% 100.0%
Pooling & servicing no. 2 0 0 4 0 6
% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 100.0%
Securities purchase no. 38 54 1 24 5 122
% 31.1% 44.3% 0.8% 19.7% 4.1% 100.0%
Security agreements no. 2 3 0 15 0 20
% 10.0% 15.0% 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Settlements no. 8 3 0 1 0 12
% 66.7% 25.0% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 100.0%
Trust agreements no. 0 0 0 1 0 1
% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Underwriting no. 0 14 0 1 0 15
% 0.0% 93.3% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 100.0%
Total no, 170 131 4 151 23 479
% 35.5% 27.3% 0.8% 315% 4.8% 100.0%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span from January 2002 to June 30, 2002, for all
contract types other than mergers and January 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. = discretion.
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TABLE A4: FREQUENCY OF ATrORNEY-FEE CLAUSES,
BY INDUSTRY
Contract type
Mineral industries no.
Construction industries no.
Manufacturing no.
Transportation & utilities no.
Communications no.
Wholesale trade no.
Retail trade no.
Finance, insurance, & real
estate no.
Services no.
Instruments & related products
no.
Food & kindred products;
agriculture, forestry, fishing no.
Paper & allied products no.
Chemicals & allied products no,
Industrial machinery &
equipment no.
Electrical & electronic
equipment no.
Transportation equipment no,
No SIC listed or SIC missing no.
Total no.
Am. rule
25
28.4%
11
44.0%
61
43.9%
25
28.7%
37
42.5%
21
27.6%
33
39.3%
241
35.5%
181
38.9%
25
47.2%
13
43.3%
6
42.9%
55
45.1%
22
Eng. r
39
44.3
8
32.0
43
30.9
43
49.4
36
41.4
25
32.9
32
38.1
239
35.3%
170
36.6%
18
34.0%
12
40.0%
4
28.6%
45
36.9%
33
Eng. rule,
ule with disc.
4
% 4.5%
1
% 4.0%
4
% 2.9%
6
% 6.9%
%1 1.1%
3
% 3.9%
2
% 2.4%
58
8.6%
7
1.5%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
7.1%
3
2.5%
3
One Co.
pays fees
15
17.0%
2
8.0%
24
17.3%
11
12.6%
10
11.5%
18
23.7%
14
16.7%
121
17.8%
79
17.0%
6
11.3%
4
13.3%
2
14.3%
14
11.5%
17
Other
5
5.7%
3
12.0%
7
5.0%
2
2.3%
3
3.4%
9
11.8%
3
3.6%
19
2.8%
28
6.0%
4
7.5%
1
3.3%
1
7.1%
5
4.1%
13
Total
88
100.0%
25
100.0%
139
100.0%
87
100.0%
87
100.0%
76
100.0%
84
100.0%
678
100.0%
465
100.0%
53
100.0%
30
100.0%
14
100.0%
122
100.0%
88
25.0% 37.5% 3.4% 19.3% 14.8% 100.0%
41 42 4 19 4 110
37.3% 38.2% 3.6% 17.3% 3.6% 100.0%
8 10 3 5 2 28
28.6% 35.7% 10.7% 17.9% 7.1% 100.0%
65 56 1 43 8 173
37.6% 32.4% 0.6% 24.9% 4.6% 100.0%
870 855 101 404 117 2347
37.1% 36.4% 4.3% 17.2% 5.0% 100.0%
Source SEC EDGAR database. The dates for these data span fromJanuary 2002 toJune 30, 2002,
for all contract types other than mergers andJanuary 2002 toJuly 31, 2002, for merger contracts.
Note no. = number of contracts; Am. rule = American rule; Eng. rule = English rule; disc. =
discretion. Reporting company SEC filings include a four-digit Standard Industry Classification
(SIC) code. The SIC codes yield many industry categories with too few firm for statistical
analysis. We aggregate the SIC categories into seventeen reasonably sized classifications. The
twenty-eight industry groups used in U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-864, PUBLIc
AccoUNTINc FiRms; MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 111 (2003), were
reduced to the seventeen industry groups used in Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey,
Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large
Clients, I J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 286 tbl.6 (2004).
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